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NOTES
THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY
INCOME PROGRAM: THE "REVOLUTION"
NEEDS REFORM
Enacted as part of "the most massive revision of the social
security laws that the Congress has ever undertaken,"' Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI) 2 is the nation's first federally-guaranteed
cash income program.3 SSI provides for federal administration of
congressionally-determined cash benefits from the United States
Treasury to aged, blind, and disabled Americans. It also estab-
lished uniform eligibility requirements, eliminated some of the
worst aspects of old welfare systems, and gives states strong finan-
cial incentives to supplement the basic grants.
Prior to 1974, the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) provided financial assistance only to state-administered
plans; under SSI Congress for the first time assumed primary re-
' 118 CONG. REc. 32470 (1972) (remarks of Senator Long). Senator Long was refer-
ring to H.R. 1, which ultimately became the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (Supp. V 1975) (Tide XVI of the Social Security Act of 1935,
as amended). For descriptions of SSI as enacted by Congress, administered by the govern-
ment, and interpreted by the courts, see Soc. SEC. ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL, pts. 5 (Dec. 1976), 12-13 (Jan.
1977) [hereinafter CLAIMS MANUAL]; Hearings on Administration of the Supplemental Security
Income Program Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., vols. 1-3 (1975-1976) [hereinafter Administration of SSI, vol. _];
Hearings on Barriers to Health Care for Older Americans Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10 [hereinafter Barriers
to Health Care]; Hearings on Development of the Supplemental Security Income Program Before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
vols. 1-2 (1975) [hereinafter Development of SSI, vol. _ ]; Hearings on Future Directions in
Social Security Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. & 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., pts. 6-8, 10, 12-13 (1974-1975) [hereinafter Future Directions, pt. -- ]; STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93d CONG., 2d SESs.,
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: 1975, at 113-39 (Comm. Print 1974);
Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-The Supplemental Security Income Program, 60
CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1975); Note, Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv.
859, 880-92 (1974); Note, Welfare Law-1972 Social Security Act Amendments-Supplemental
Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 803 (1973).
1 See M. BOWLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED INCOME PROPOSAL: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
IN POLICY CHANGE 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter BOWLER];, V.J. BURKE & V. BURKE, NIXON'S
GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 188, 190, 198 (1974) [hereinafter BURKE].
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sponsibility for a public income transfer program that directly
makes payments to recipients. 4 The states, if they choose, merely
supplement the federally-guaranteed income floor. SSI is the first
step toward the transformation of welfare from a state and local
matter to one of primary federal concern, and therefore represents
a turning point in the development and philosophy of public assis-
tance in this country.5
The implementation of SSI has been hailed by some as a
"revolution, '6 and by others more modestly as part of "a basic
restructuring of the national welfare system. . . ."I Inevitably it will
serve as a basis for the reform of the other major categorical wel-
fare programs, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Medicaid. 8 Accordingly, this Note will evaluate SSI not only as
a system designed to meet the needs of recipients, but also as a
model for the "federalization" of other welfare plans. Recent judi-
cial, regulatory, and legislative developments will be analyzed to-
gether with the original framework of the program and its per-
formance since 1973. Because SSI has been in operation for more
than three years, it is now possible to identify the problems inher-
ent in its statutory and regulatory structure. This Note will there-
fore suggest changes in the basic provisions to help the program
fulfill the initial expectations of recipient and government alike.
I During the Depression of the 1930's, the federal government made relief payments
directly to needy individuals. This program, however, was only temporary and limited to
half a dozen states. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 190.
' See, e.g., BOWLER, supra note 3, at 1-2; BURKE, supra note 3, at 190, 198. The Senate
Finance Committee wrote that SSI represents "a major departure from the traditional con-
cept of public assistance as it now applies to the aged, the blind, and the disabled." S. REP.
No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1972). One observer has gone so far as to say that SSI
"represents a major congressional initiative on behalf of the elderly comparable to the
enactment of the original Social Security Act in 1935." Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2,
at 669 (1974) (statement of Dir. of N.Y.C. Office on Aging).
6 BURKE, supra note 3, at 190, 195-98.
H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4989, 4989 [hereinafter 1971 HousE REPORT].
I See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 80 (statement of Lt. Gov. of Mass.); id.
at 144 (statement of Rep. Corman); id. at 322, 326 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Work-
ers); Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 675 (statement of member of Bd. of Dirs. of
Community Council of Greater N.Y.). Some have already made specific suggestions con-
cerning the procedure for "federalizing" AFDC based on the experience with SSI. See, e.g.,
Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1073-74 (1975) (statement of SSA employee).
Furthermore, the continuing trend towards federalization of other social programs and the
institution of a national health insurance plan may hinge upon SSA's record of administer-
ing SSI. See Washington Star, Aug. 24, 1975, at A-8, col. 2 (Sunday ed.) (statement of staff
att'y to Cal. state legislature). (All issues of the Washington Star cited herein are on file at
the Cornell Law Review).
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I
SSI IN OPERATION
The three "state-administered" grants-in-aid programs for the
aged, blind, and disabled which SSI replaced 9 were actually more
than a thousand different state, county, and local welfare plans.
Because responsibility was diffused, these programs created a
bizarre patchwork of varying eligibility requirements, benefit
levels, and miscellaneous laws that were both inequitable and un-
workable.' 0 SSI, on the other hand, paved the way for the creation
of a uniform national system. Economies of scale," centraliza-
' The three "state" programs, contained in Titles I, X, and XIV of the Social Security
Act, are Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (Supp. V 1975), Aid to the Blind
(AB), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (Supp. V 1975), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled (APTD), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (Supp. V 1975). Title XVI of the Social Security
Act permits the combination of all the adult categories into one plan, Aid to the Aged,
Blind, or Disabled (AABD), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970). They are all supervised at the
federal level by the Social and Rehabilitation Service Administration of HEW. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 201 (1976).
These programs remain in effect only in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
42 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 1201 note, 1351 note (Supp. V 1975). This exclusion of SSI may be
subject to successful attack under the fifth amendment's equal protection clause. See
Cintron v. Richardson, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 21,186 (April 7,
1975), 43 U.S.L.W. 2455 (D.P.R. 1975) (exclusion of American citizens residing in Puerto
Rico from certain monthly Social Security benefits is unconstitutional, invidious discrimina-
tion). In any case, H.R. 8911, known as the Supplemental Security Income Amendments of
1976, would extend SSI to these areas. See H.R. 8911, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1976)
[hereinafter H.R. 8911]. Although Congress will have to modify the program to fit the
needs of these jurisdictions (see H.R. REP. No. 1201, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 18 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 HOUSE REPORT]; 122 CONG. REC. S. 17705-06 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)
(remarks of Senator Long)), it should enact this part of the bill to streamline assistance to
the aged, blind, and disabled. The federal government should not continue to administer
two fundamentally different types of aid to the same population.
" See 1971 HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3; Barriers to Health Care, supra note 2, at
1004 (statement of Sr. Planning Officer of Bureau of SSI); Future Directions, pt. 6, supra
note 2, at 472-73 (statement of Senator Church). The adult categorical plans were a maze
of federal, state, and local rules created, interpreted, and administered by about 20 con-
gressional committees, 50 state legislatures, 54 state and territorial agencies, and 1,500
county welfare departments. See Reinhold, Welfare, Still No Cure-All, N.Y. Times, July 11,
1976, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
" Hearings on Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations for 1974 Before
the Subcomm. on Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 746-47 (1973) (statement of Acting
Soc. Sec. Comm'r Arthur E. Hess) [hereinafter House Hearings on Appropriations for 1974];
Hearing on the Need for Protecting Aged, Blind, and Disabled Welfare Recipients from Suffering a
Reduction in Benefits when the New Federal Supplemental Security Income Program Becomes Effec-
tive in January 1974 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1973)
(statement of HEW Sec'y Caspar W. Weinberger) [hereinafter 1973 Senate Finance Comm.
Hearing].
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tion,12  and computerization 13 promised inexpensive, swift, and
accurate delivery of benefits to recipients. Furthermore, it was
thought that the so-called adult categories,' 4 smaller and less
troublesome than AFDC, were easier to reform. 15
Despite these advantages, the transition to SSI has been dif-
ficult. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has
admitted that during the first eighteen months of operation, it
might have overpaid recipients as much as $800 million, or ten
percent of total benefits distributed;' 6 in fact, the figure may ap-
proach $1 billion.' 7 This situation developed because of the high
initial error rates-nearly one out of every four checks was written
for the wrong amount18-and because improvement in accuracy
12 In testifying before Congress, Social Security Commissioner Cardwell stated:
At the time the legislation was under consideration by the Congress, proponents
of the legislation argued-and I think the Congress itself had this general un-
derstanding-that the Social Security Administration, managing this program on
a national basis from a central headquarters, would be able to do so more ef-
ficiently and with less cost and with less manpower than the States.
Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 990-91. See Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note
2, at 16, 19 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
13 Commissioner Cardwell noted that SSA operated under the assumption that "a
single administration centered on advanced use of computers would be at least 100 percent
more efficient than 1,150 individual administrations, not all of which were automated."
Hearings on Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations for 1975 Before the
Subcomm. on Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations of the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 406-07 (1974) [hereinafter House Hearings on
Appropriations for 1975].
14 OAA, AB, and APTD were known as the "adult categories" since children were not
eligible for benefits under any of these programs. Children, however, may receive SSI if
they meet the statutory definitions of blindness or disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.901
(1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (Supp. V 1975). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1050
(1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(c) (Supp. V 1975) ("child" defined).
'"See 117 CONG. REc. 21341 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); 1971 HousE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 146; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 15, 1971, at 44, col. 2 (interview
with Rep. Mills of Ark.).
6 Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 9, 35 (statements of Comm'r Cardwell).
This estimate reflected overpayments or duplicate payments to eligibles and payments to
ineligibles made by SSA in either the basic federal benefit or the federally-administered
mandatory and optional supplementary payments. See id. at 9.
" Washington Star, Aug. 15, 1975, at A-1, cols. 2-3 (home final). See Administration
of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 6 (statement of Rep. Gibbons). The total amount of overpay-
ments, however large, still understates the financial impact on the government. In 34 states
and the District of Columbia, eligibility for SSI means automatic eligibility for Medicaid.
See note 33 and accompanying text infra. Consequently, payments to SSI ineligibles cause
Medicaid overpayments as well. See Washington Star, Aug. 21, 1975, at A-8, col. 3 (capital
special).
"
5 Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 7 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell);
Washington Star, Aug. 16, 1975, at A-I, col. 1 (Sat. morning) (23% error rate for SSI).
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has been exceedingly slow. 19 As a result, states with federally-
administered supplements have withheld approximately $200 mil-
lion because of overpayment and other errors made on their behalf
by SSA,2" and some have abandoned federal administration of
supplemental benefits 21  despite the added financial burden of
doing so. 22 Not surprisingly, SSI has generated increasing friction
The number of mistaken payments has remained high. During the second and third six-
month periods of the program's operation, the error rate was roughly the same: about
25%. Hearings on Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations for 1977 Before
the Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 292 (1976) (letter from Comm'r Cardwell to
Rep. Ullman) [hereinafter House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt...---]. These rates,
although exceeding HEW's objectives, are about the same as those of the states under the
superseded categorical programs. Id. at 320 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell); Hearings on
Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare Appropriations for 1976 Before the Subcomm. on
the Dep'ts of Labor and Health, Educ., and Welfare of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 335 (1975) (statement of Comm'r Cardwell) [hereinafter House
Hearings on Appropriations for 1976]. Error rates under the old assistance plans and those
under SSI are not comparable since the new program is simpler, and therefore should be
more accurate. Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Comm'r Card-
well). See also House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra, at 315 (states with more
complex public assistance programs have higher error rates); Development of SSI, vol. 2,
supra note 2, at 132 (standardization of programs reduces errors).
19 SSA has claimed that error rates have decreased as it has corrected initial mistakes.
House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note 18, at 335 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell). Improvement in payment accuracy up to the middle of 1975, however, was
almost nonexistent (1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 15), and the prospect for sig-
nificant change seems remote. Commissioner Cardwell has stated that "our very best
administrative efforts and our most efficient performance is not likely to develop a payment
error level below 15 percent .... " Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 19 (em-
phasis added). Further improvements in accuracy can only be achieved by simplifying the
program. See id. at 19, 22, 30 (statements of Comm'r Cardwell); House Hearings on Appro-
priations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 297, 314, 329-30 (statements of Comm'r Card-
well).
"2 House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 321; Development of
SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 19, 27-29; Washington Star, Aug. 18, 1975, at A-i, col. I
(capital special). SSA has continued to make payments to recipients in those states that
have refused to pay, but it has considered terminating federal administration, especially in
cases where errors have been alleged without sufficient documentation. Development of SSI,
vol. 1, supra note 2, at 28. Some states have continued to meet their obligations and have
contemplated resolving disagreements by other means, including litigation. See House Hear-
ings on Appropriationsfor 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 320; Washington Star, Aug. 19, 1975,
at A-6, col. 5 (capital special). Payment mistakes made by SSA in its administration of both
optional and mandatory supplements have forced HEW to ask Congress for large appro-
priations to cover reimbursement to the states. See House Hearings on Appropriations for
1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 287, 299-300, 356-57.
21 See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
22 States choosing to administer their own supplementary payments must assume all
costs of both administration and benefits. If a state agrees to federal administration of the
mandatory supplement only, HEW will assume the cost of administration. When SSA ad-
ministers only the optional supplement, the federal government pays administrative ex-
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between state and federal officials23 as well as widespread disen-
chantment with the Social Security Administration,24 an agency
with a reputation as the most efficient and best run branch of the
federal government.2
5
Furthermore, operating costs have significantly exceeded orig-
inal predictions. For Fiscal Year 1977 it has been estimated that it
will take more than a half-billion dollars just to administer SS1.26
penses, and the state is protected against the possible costs of increased numbers of re-
cipients due to the more liberal eligibility rules of SSI. This "hold harmless" provision
ensures that the state will not have to pay more than it did under the former categori-
cal programs for the comparable quarter in calendar year 1972. This provision applies only
to supplemental payment levels up to those in effect in January 1972; states must pay the
cost of benefits above this level. Should a state agree to SSA administration of both sup-
plements, the federal government will pay all costs of administration, and the state will
pay only the cost of the supplemental benefit up to the amount of the state's expenditures
for the corresponding program in 1972 plus any portion of the state supplement exceed-
ing January 1972 payment levels in the comparable program. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.2001-
.2090 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382e, 1382e note (Supp. V 1975).
23 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 514, 517; Washington Star, Aug. 18,
1975, at A-1, cols. 1-3 (capital special).
- See Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at I (statement of Rep. Gibbons); Future
Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1029 (statement of Nat'l Pres. of Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees).
2
-Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1081. Because of its deserved reputation for
efficiency, the Social Security Administration has been called the "white hat bureaucracy."
FORBES, Oct. 15, 1974, at 36, col. 3.
26 Appropriations for administrative expenses have skyrocketed in the four fiscal years
(1974-77) during which SSI has been paying benefits. SSA originally estimated that it
would take $321,962,000 to run the program during FY 1974. (This figure includes six
months (July-December 1973) of start-up costs and six months (January-June 1974) of
expenses during SSI's first half year of operation.) House Hearings on Appropriations for
1974, supra note 11, at 745, 753, 754-55. Actual costs for that period, however, were closer
to $367,808,000. House Hearings on Appropriations for 1975, supra note 13, at 432. In the
next year Congress first allotted $396,754,000, but SSA later asked for a supplemental
appropriation (Hearings on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1975, Before Subcomms. of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 814, 819-20, 869, 879
(1975) [hereinafter Hearings on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1975]), making the
amount $473,249,000 (House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note 18, at 364). SSA
first requested $498,635,000 for FY 1976 (id. at 331, 364), but spent only $495,660,000
(House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 302). Estimates indicate
that it will cost about $500,352,000 to operate the program in FY 1977. Id. at 287.
Although these figures are not precisely comparable because of minor adjustments in
administrative procedure, they do demonstrate the fast upward trend in operating ex-
penses. Moreover, the estimates were calculated on the premise that a significantly higher
number of recipients would actually participate in the program; therefore, these figures
tend to mask the true increase in per-recipient administrative cost. For example, the origi-
nal estimate for FY 1974 ($321,962,000) assumed that 6.2 million individuals would be
receiving basic federal payments or federally-administered state supplements. House Hear-
ings on Appropriations for 1974, supra note 11, at 745. Persons receiving such benefits in FY
1974, however, never totaled more than 3,583,894. Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1974, at 65
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Large expected savings have therefore not materialized: SSA has
been operating the program at approximately the same cost as the
states incurred in administering the superseded categorical plans.2 7
Unfortunately, these problems tell only half the story. The real
tragedy of SSI has been its effect on the aged, blind, and dis-
abled. There are many individuals who totally rely upon the pro-
gram for their survival. Despite the use of the word "supplemen-
tal" in its name, SSI is often a supplement to nothing.28 Moreover,
it may take more than a year to receive the first benefit,29 a re-
placement check, 30 or an administrative determination of one's
(Table M-23). Furthermore, there have been charges that hundreds of millions of dollars
from the Social Security Trust Fund have been illegally used to finance the operation of
SSI. See House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 7, supra note 18, at 166-67 (statement
of Rep. Vanik). If these accusations are true, then the estimates cited above probably un-
derstate the true administrative costs for the program. For a description of the relationship
of the Trust Fund and SSI, see House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note
18, at 287, 289-90, 355.
Despite the advantages of centralization, automation, and economies of scale, SSA be-
lieves that administrative expenses will always be "significantly higher" than the pre-1974
estimates because of the complexity of the program. Id. at 317 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell).
" House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note. 18, at 336 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell).
28 See Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 976 (statement of Senator Pell). Accord-
ingly, SSI recipients have been called "America's weakest citizens." Future Directions, pt. 7,
supra note 2, at 582 (statement of Exec. Dir. of Nat'l Council of Sr. Citizens). Many re-
cipients are totally destitute, and, even with SSI benefits, do not have the means to main-
tain a decent standard of living. See, e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 167, 542
(recipients take toilet paper from facilities serving them and food from lunch programs for
evening meals); id. at 167 (elderly woman shrinks her stomach with lemons and hot water
when she has no food); id. at 296-97, 638 (the old must shoplift to eat); id. at 638 (25% of
dog and cat food purchased in U.S. is intended for human consumption).
"9 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 336 (statement of staff att'y of Nat'l Sr.
Citizens Law Center); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 974 (statement of Senator
Kennedy); id. at 1043 (statement of Vice Pres. of Mass. Ass'n for Older Ams., Inc.).
The backlog of unprocessed claims has been one of the most serious problems pla-
guing SSI. This situation developed in large part because SSA incorrectly handled the
information it was required to process. Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 544 (state-
ment of Comm'r Cardwell). Thus, at one time SSA accumulated a backlog of approxi-
mately three-quarters of a million applications. Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at
27 (statement of Assoc. Soc. Sec. Comm'r for Program Operations). SSA originally esti-
mated that it could "bring the backlog under full control by the end of fiscal year 1976"
(U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 2, 1975, at 61, col. 3), although it now thinks it will
take longer (House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 457).
3 See Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 975-76, 1056 (statements of Senator
Pell). SSA claims that it now takes an average of 7 to 10 days to replace a check.
Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 11. Some, however, still feel that more should be
done in this area. The National Senior Citizens Law Center, for example, has stated that
the only solution to this problem is to authorize local Social Security offices to write re-
placement checks: "Any procedure which depends on a computer sending certain informa-
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rights.31 The most unfortunate are those who are wrongfully de-
nied benefits initially. 2 Withholding SSI payments can also mean
a loss of Medicaid because eligibility for the two programs is cur-
rently linked in 34 states and the District of Columbia."
Other evidence further outlines the plight of recipients. Al-
don to the Treasury Department is not going to be satisfactory." Future Directions, pt. 12,
supra note 2, at 1103-04. Senator Pell has advanced a similar solution. He is the principal
sponsor of S. 985, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Future Directions, pt. 12, supra
note 2, at 1059-65 [hereinafter S. 985], the Social Security Recipients Fairness Act of 1975,
which requires that SSA issue a replacement check within one day after receipt of notifica-
tion that the original was delayed three days or stolen. Id. § 101. See Future Directions, pt. 12,
supra note 2, at 978, 1060-62. Although this bill does not specifically require local offices to
issue such checks, the one-day-issuance provision precludes any other method because of
the inherent slowness of centralized bureaucracies. See notes 87-91 and accompanying text
infra.
3 1 Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1013 (statement of Senator Percy). During
one period the national average waiting time between the filing of an appeal and a deci1
sion was more than 200 days. Id. at 985 (statement of Soc. Sec. Boston Regional Comm'r)
This problem is so severe that even with the addition of personnel and increases in pro-
ductivity (see id. at 10 17-19; Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 8), SSA does not
expect to bring the SSI appeals problem under control by the middle of calendar year
1978 (House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 396 (statement of
Comm'r Cardwell)).
The most unfortunate aspect of these backlogs is the fate of individuals cut off from
benefits. There are no federal provisions for financial relief of those awaiting administra-
tive determinations of their rights. Whatever assistance these persons receive must come
from state programs, if they exist. Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 985-86 (ex-
change between Senator Kennedy and Comm'r Cardwell).
32 There are no statistics on the number of eligible individuals erroneously denied
benefits. It has been estimated, however, that there were about 100,000 to 200,000 wrong-
ful "informal denials" during the first five months of 1974 alone. Future Direction, pt. 7,
supra note 2, at 601 (statement of Dir. of Litigation of S.F. Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation). See also Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 470 (informal denials still
prevent hundreds of thousands of potentially eligible recipients from receiving benefits).
There is evidence that 90% of all denials are accomplished informally, i.e., by oral or visual
examination. Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 599. Therefore, no right to challenge
an incorrect decision exists since an appeal may only be taken from a notice of denial after
submission of a written application. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1401-.1413 (1976). Of those who
formally apply, some are the victims of administrative errors, and since there is little re-
checking or opportunity for "follow up," there are potentially thousands of eligible indi-
viduals who do not receive benefits. Future Directions, pt. 13, supra note 2, at 1188-89
(statement of North of Mkt. Health Council (S.F.)). See Murillo v. Mathews, 10 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 477 (1976) (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1976) (suit challenging SSA's policy of informally
denying SSI benefits dismissed on subject matter jurisdiction grounds).
33 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SUPPLE-
MENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED: SUMMARY OF STATE PAYMENT
LEvELS, STATE SUPPLEMENTATION, AND MEDICAID DECISIONS (Aug. 9, 1976) [hereinafter 1976
STATE SUMMARY]. See also Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 25, 38 (statement of
Comm'r Cardwell); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1041, 1101 (statement of Vice
Pres. of Mass. Ass'n for Older Ams., Inc.); Washington Star, Aug. 18, 1975, at A-8, col. 1
(capital special).
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though the news media have focused attention on the truly awe-
some size of the overpayments, SSA has underpaid recipients by
millions of dollars, 34 causing incalculable personal hardship and
distress. 35 Furthermore, the government has used tactics of ques-
tionable constitutionality36 to recover the millions in mistaken pay-
ments.3 7 As a result, recipients have swamped Congress weekly
34 Washington Star, Aug. 15, 1975, at A-1, col. 5 (home final) ($35 million in under-
payments). See also House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 292
(approximately 5-6% of checks are underpayments). SSA is obligated to pay recipients the
amounts of underpayments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.542(a), .543 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(b) (Supp. V 1975). The Social Security Act, however, prohibits payments of under-
payments to a deceased recipient's estate or spouse who is ineligible for benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(b) (Supp. V 1975), implemented by 20 C.F.R. § 416.542(b) (1976). Payments may be
made, however, if the surviving spouse is a recipient and was living with the deceased at
the time of the underpayment or was not separated for six months at the time of death. Id.
This distinction, challenged on both equal protection and due process grounds, has been
upheld in Patterson v. Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
35 House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 7, supra note 18, at 164-65 (statement
of Rep. Vanik). SSA's untimely and inconsistent delivery of benefits has prompted recip-
ients to seek judicial relief. See, e.g., Santos v. Weinberger, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder]
Pov. L. REP'. (CCH) 21,230 (D. Mass. June 16, 1975) (HEW ordered to process SSI
applications within 45 days). States offering aid to SSI recipients also have been the target
of similar challenges. See, e.g., Preacely v. Trainor, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 511 (1975) (N.D.
Ill., filed Oct. 6, 1975) (Ill. agrees to provide housekeeping services payments more
promptly).
a HEW has occasionally admitted having unlawfully reduced, suspended, or termi-
nated SSI benefits. See Miller v. Weinberger, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP.
(CCH) 19,692 (M.D. Tenn. July 1, 1974).
Furthermore, Cardinale v. Mathews, 399 F. Supp. 1163 (D.D.C. 1975), rel)ing on
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), held unconstitutional as a violation of due process
20 C.F.R. § 416.1336(a) (1975), which authorized SSA to reduce, suspend, or terminate
SSI benefits without advance written notice in certain situations. These include changes
made pursuant to federal law or increases in other government benefits (see 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1336(a)(2) (1975)), correction of clerical or mechanical error (id. § 416.1336(a)(3)), or
adjustments required by facts that are complete, not subject to conflicting interpretation,
and are provided by the recipient (id. § 416.1336(a)(4)). The court enjoined enforcement
of these exceptions (399 F. Supp. at 1175-76) so that SSA must send notices of planned
reductions, suspensions, or terminations and maintain payments until the expiration of a
30-day (subsequently amended to 10-day) period or the completion of a requested recon-
sideration. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1336(c) (1976) (amending id. § 416.1336(c) (1975)). The
parties in Cardinale have since agreed to a modification of the order. See [1974-1976 Trans-
fer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 22,641 (D.D.C., stipulation filed Feb. 20, 1976) (SSA
allowed to reduce, suspend, or terminate payments without advance written notice in cases
of multiple payments to the same person or payments in excess of statutory ceilings). Addi'-
tionally, HEW has recently issued proposed regulations to implement the district court's
order. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2079 (1977).
Although Cardinale will certainly be hailed by some as an extension of recipients' due
process rights, it has been severely criticized by both the Executive Branch and Congress as
adversely affecting SSA and significantly increasing operating and benefit costs on the
order of $300 million a year. See Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 1, 9-11, 63-64,
85-86; House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, p t. 6, supra note 18, at 325, 370.
31 Washington Star, Aug. 15, 1975, at A-1, col. 5 (home final) ($57 million already
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with thousands of requests for aid.3 8 Accordingly, the program has
come under intensive scrutiny from executive agencies,39 congres-
sional committees, 40 and private interest groups. 41
In light of these facts, many have claimed that despite gener-
ally higher benefit levels and other advantages, 42 the nation's aged,
blind, and disabled are actually worse off under SSI than under
the old assistance plans. 43 There has been unanimous agreement
that from any viewpoint-recipient, government, or taxpayer-SSI
has not fulfilled its expectations. Results have been so dishearten-
ing that some have suggested that the Nixon Administration used
SSI to show that the federal government is inherently incapable of
collected). See also Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Acting
Assoc. Soc. Sec. Comm'r for Program Operations).
31 Washington Star, Sept. 12, 1975, at A-i, col. 5 (home final) (9,300 Social Security
and SSI complaints per week). See id. at A- 11, col. 8 (SSA repQrt reveals SSI and Social
Security complaints represent 25-75% of all constituent inquiries received).
39 The Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury Department, and HEW
(which had three separate investigations) have all studied the operation of SSI. See Ad-
ministration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 17-18.
"' The Senate Finance Committee, the House Committee on Ways and Means, the
Senate Special Committee on Aging, and the Senate Appropriations Committee have inves-
tigated SSI. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 13; Washington Star, Sept. 14, 1975,
at A-I, col. 5 (Sunday ed.); hearings cited in note'2 supra.'Furthermore, the General Ac-
counting Office, Congress's investigating arm, has also conducted 12 major studies of the
program. E.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: PROBLEMS IN
ADMINISTERING SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED
(1976) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
41 See hearings cited in note 2 supra.
42 SSI affords a number of advantages to the elderly, blind, and disabled. First, since
benefits are generally higher than those under the superseded categorical programs, it has
reduced poverty among these groups. Compare Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1976, at 69 (Table
M-32), with id. at 66-68 (Tables M-28 to M-31). Second, there is less stigma attached to the
program partially because it is administered by SSA instead of the county and local "wel-
fare" offices. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 157 (statement of Rep.
Holtzman); Future Directions, pt. 6, supra note 2, at 473 (statement of Senator Church).
Third, there are no liens or encumbrances imposed upon property for the basic federal
payment or any part of state supplements financed by federal funds. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.2035(b)(3) (1976). Nor are relatives financially responsible for recipients except for
(1) ineligible spouses (20 C.F.R. § 416.1101(1)(i), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(I)
(Supp. V 1975)), or (2) parents of disabled or blind children living at home (20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1055(c), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(2) (Supp. V 1975)). A state is free, how-
ever, to impose some of these requirements on optional supplements, but the federal gov-
ernment will not enforce these provisions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.2035(b) (1976). Finally, with
respect to the aged, blind, and disabled as a whole, SSI has broadened the number of
individuals eligible for benefits. Compare SOC. SEC. BULL., May 1975, at 62 (Table M-31),
with id. at 58 (Table M-23).
4 See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1072 (statement of SSA employee);
Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 687-88 (statement of Exec. Dir. of N.Y. State-Wide
Sr. Action Council).
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running a centralized welfare program.44 Many have therefore
called upon Congress to abolish SSI and return responsibility to
the states.45
As the first three years of operation illustrate, the concept
behind SSI-a guaranteed minimum income-has suffered in ap-
plication. Inevitable transitional problems have played their role in
its disappointing performance.46 It is now evident, however, that
structural defects in the program have also been responsible for
many initial difficulties. 47
44 Washington Star, Aug. 24, 1975, at A-8, cols. 2-3 (Sunday ed.) (remarks of staff att'y
to Cal. state legislature). See, e.g., Administration of SS1, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 26 (Rep. Stark
suggests SSA purposefully mismanaged SSI to show that HEW could not administer a
national health insurance program); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1026 (Nat'l
Pres. of Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees raises possibility that Nixon Administration tried to
discredit the Social Security System). Although most have not imputed such ill motives,
some have blamed various aspects of SSI's woes on what they believed to be calculated
policy decisibns of the Nixon Administration. See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2,
at 723 (policy of deliberate procrastination in finding new SSI recipients to reduce benefits
costs); Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 574, 577, 582 (SSI implementation pro-
grammed for delay because of budget reasons).
45 See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 688, 798 (references to testimony
before N.Y.S. Assembly Standing Comm. on Soc. Serv.); Washington Star, Aug. 24, 1975,
at A-8, cols. 3-6 (Sunday ed.) (remarks of former HEW Comm'r of Welfare). See also Future
Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1053 (statement of unidentified SSA employee); Future
Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 657 (statement of SSI Alert-Action Comm. of Yonkers
Branch of Westchester County (N.Y.) Legal Aid Soc'y). Others, however, have made
recommendations that would have the same effect. A few have suggested that Congress
merge SSI into a guaranteed minimum income plan for all Americans. These proposals
would abandon the means test and recoup payments to the non-needy through taxes. See,
e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 326 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Work-
ers). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 8 (Govs. of N.J., N.Y., Pa. & Wis.). Some
think that SSI should be administered by states under contract with SSA. See, e.g., Future
Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 750 (statement of Comm'r of W. Va. Dep't of Welfare).
This solution, which is similar to the categorical grants-in-aid approach, might initially as-
sure more uniformity in benefits and eligibility requirements than the old plans. In the
long run, however, conflicting interpretations, different procedures, and "lawless" ad-
ministration that were hallmaiks of the old system would re-create the patchwork of state,
county, and local variations. Others would transplant the superseded provisions of OAA,
AB, and APTD into SSI, and return administration to the states. See, e.g., id. at 790 (state-
ment of Independent Study Group of Bay Shore, (N.Y.)).
46 See sources cited in note 2 supra. For a narrative of SSI's transitional problems and
initial difficulties, see the Washington Star from Aug. 15, 1975 through Sept. 16, 1975.
" Both SSA and its critics have asserted that statutory requirements contributed to
SSI's early troubles. See, e.g., Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of
Rep. Gibbons); Future Directions, ,pt. 8, supra note 2, at 751 (statement of Comm'r of W. Va.
Dep't of Welfare). Growing recognition that problems have been caused by complex statu-
tory provisions has led to the increasing number of recent congressional and administrative
investigations. See Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Gib-
bons). See also notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra. Commissioner Cardwell has iden-
tified a number of serious problems, especially in the mandatory and optional supple-
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II
MANDATORY SUPPLEMENTS
Although the legislative history of SSI is sparse,48 it is clear
that Congress originally intended to establish a program that
would be as simple and inexpensive to administer as the Social
Security retirement system.49 Indeed, the ninety-second Congress
in large part passed SSI because, like Social Security, it could be
sold "as a program which was amenable to a highly centralized and
automated implementation effort."50 Moreover, the basic federal
component of SSI was specifically designed so that it could be
administered by a single national agency. 51 As originally enacted,
SSI, apart from the optional supplement, 52 was a straightforward,
"nationally uniform flat-grant system. ' 53 It did not go as far as
other programs to tailor each recipient's benefits to his particular
situation. Instead, it relied more upon presumptive needs and con-
clusive presumptions,54 thereby simplifying administration. In
short, the version that emerged from Congress in 1972 was, for the
ments, living arrangement, resource, and verification areas. See Parts II, III, IV A, IV C
& IV D infra.4 8 See BOWLER, supra note 3, at 147; BURKE, supra note 3, at 4, 195-98.
49 "SSI has been developed in the image of the OASDI program." Ozawa, SSI: Progress
or Retreat?, PUB. WELFARE, Spring 1974, at 33, 34. See Radin, The Implementation of SSI:
Guaranteed Income or Welfare?, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1974, at 7.
51 Radin, supra note 49, at 7.
5 1 See Ozawa, supra note 49, at 33-34.52 See Part III infra.
"
3 Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell). See also
Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 539 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell). Many have
strongly criticized the "flat-grant" approach because of its inflexibility: "the people who
devised the SSI system buil[t] in an overbearing emphasis . . . on straight-jacketed uni-
formity." Id. at 645 (statement of Comm'r of Nassau County (N.Y.) Dep't of Soc. Serv.). See
also Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 798 (letter from Adm'r of SSI-Alert Program of
N.Y.S. Office for the Aging to Senator Church); Ozawa, supra note 49, at 33-34.
54 See Ozawa, supra note 49, at 33, 34. Congress enacted a number of conclusive pre-
sumptions for SSI, two of which have attracted considerable attention. First, there is a
one-third reduction in benefits for those living in the households of others (see notes 104,
107-15 and accompanying text infra); second, Congress mandated the six-month dura-
tion-of-separation requirement of 20 C.F.R. § 416.1001(a) (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(b) (Supp. V 1975). By requiring each spouse to receive only one-half of a couple's
benefit until six months after their separation, this latter provision discourages eligible
couples from separating to collect higher benefits available to single individuals. Although
this conclusive presumption causes hardship and injustice, it has recently withstood due
process and equal protection challenges. Mansfield v. Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 965
(D.D.C. 1975). In Mansfield the court relied heavily upon the congressional purpose to
eliminate the financial incentive to separate and the administrative burdens of determining
the genuineness of a separation. Id. at 969. A better solution to these problems, however,
would be to narrow the gap between individuals' and couples' benefits.
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most part, a program that could be administered centrally by
machine processing.
Congress, however, substantially amended the basic legislation
before its implementation. Although it did not change the method
of calculating the basic federal grant, it added a mandatory state
supplement to ensure that no December 1973 recipient of categor-
ical assistance would suffer a reduction in payments due to the
conversion to SSI. 55 In order to calculate the mandatory supple-
ment, there must be a case-by-case analysis of individual benefits
provided under the assistance plans that existed prior to the im-
plementation of SSI. 56 In other words, this amendment, similar to
"' See 42 U.SPC. § 1382 note (Supp. V 1975). States are not legally compelled to pro-
vide mandatory supplements to recipients. Should they refuse, however, the Secretary of
HEW is empowered to withhold Medicaid funds. Id. Congress specifically excluded Texas
from this requirement because that state's constitution has been interpreted as preventing
direct payments to recipients unless such funds are matched by the federal government.
See Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 212(f), 87 Stat. 157 (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382 note (Supp. V 1975)). All other states and the District of Columbia, however, have
a mandatory program. See 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 1-35.
Congress recently amended the Social Security Act to provide that after June 30, 1977,
states must maintain optional and mandatory supplements at the levels in effect during
December 1976 or lose federal Medicaid funds. States initiating such supplements after
1976 must maintain these payments at initial levels and are also subject to the penalty
provision. However, the penalty will apply only if a state's expenditures for these supple-
ments in a particular year are less than those for the preceding year. Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-585, § 2, 90 Stat. 2901 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382g & 1382e note
& 138 2g note).
56 Recipients are eligible for mandatory supplements if (1) they received payments
under one of the superseded state-administered plans in December of 1973; (2) they are
eligible for SSI; and (3) their total income from all sources including SSI is less than they
received (or, in cases of changed circumstances, would have received) in the last month of
1973 under the old programs. A recipient's mandatory supplement is the difference be-
tween his total income in December 1973 (including the public assistance payment) and his
total income in the current month (including the basic federal SSI payment). If a
recipient's circumstances change, SSA must use the old provisions of the appropriate super-
seded plan, and recalculate what that recipient would have received in December of 1973.
Then the mandatory supplement is adjusted accordingly. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 note (Supp. V
1975)) See note 67 infra. HEW opposed the enactment of the mandatory supplement provi-
sions because
[t]here would be serious administrative implications arising out of the fact that for
many years-as long as the "grandfathered" people remain on the rolls-there
would have to be a case-by-case approach to maintaining the payments that would
take into account the multitude of special provisions in the States and local juris-
dictions.
1973 Senate Finance Comni. Hearing, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of HEW Sec'y Caspar W.
Weinberger).
Given the complicated method of computation, it is not surprising that there have
been disagreements among states, SSA, and recipients about the calculation of mandatory
supplements. See, e.g., Liberty Alliance of the Blind v. Mathews, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
812 (1976) (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 9, 1976); Bass v. Weinberger, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 903
326
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the optional supplement provisions, revived all the complexity of
superseded law which SSI was supposed to eliminate.
Not surprisingly, strong evidence exists indicating that the
complex state supplements, including mandatory payments, are
more prone to error than the basic federal grant.5 8 Furthermore,
SSA has not been able to deliver such benefits in a timely
manner.5 9 Because of these difficulties, five states have recently
(1975) (E.D. Va., filed Mar. 3, 1975); Missouri ex rel. Barker v. Graham, [1974-1976 Trans-
fer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 19,938 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 24, 1974); Montano v. Health
and Soc. Serv. Dep't, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 22,449 (N.M. Ct.
App. Mar. 18, 1976).
5 7 House Hearings on Appropriations for 1975, supra note 13, at 408-09 (statement of
Comm'r Cardwell); Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell). Public Law 93-66 not only authorized mandatory state supplementation, but also
required payments to SSI "converts" for "essential persons" (individuals providing care to
SSI recipients who received similar payments under the adult categorical programs). See 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.241-.249 (1976), implementing Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 211,
87 Stat. 154, as amended, Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 4, 87 Stat. 953
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382 note (Supp. V 1975)). Commissioner Cardwell has called the
"essential persons" provision "another departure from the concept of uniform Federal ben-
efit standards .... Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 5.
5 8 See, e.g., House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 332 (state-
ment of Comm'r Cardwell). Results of the HEW Audit Agency report for the first six-
month period of SSI's operation (January to June 1974) indicated extremely high case-
error rates (rates computed by number of cases with errors) for the 31 states that elected
federal administration of supplementary payments. Of these 31, 6 had error rates in the
20% range, 9 in the 30% range, 12 in the 40% range, 3 in the 50% range, and I in the
60% range. Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 43 (summary of HEW Audit re-
ports on SSI). Furthermore, an examination conducted by the state of Florida showed that
SSA may have been responsible for a 100% dollar-error rate (rate computed by amount of
erroneous payments) in that state's supplemental payments. Washington Star, Aug. 19,
1975, at A-6, col. 4 (capital special). These statistics indicate a higher incidence of errors in
supplementary payments than in the program as a whole. See note 18 and accompanying
text supra.
A great potential for error exists when governing rules are complex and much infor-
mation is required to determine eligibility and benefits. Consequently, administrative mis-
takes prevent a large number of eligible individuals from receiving SSI. See note 32 supra.
A number of these errors occur as employees prepare information for machine processing.
Future Directions, pt. 13, supra note 2, at 1188-89. Commissioner Cardwell has acknow-
ledged this difficulty: he has testified that the most important reason for the serious back-
logs in new claims was that "several hundred thousand cases" that presumably were eligible
did not pass "the built-in computer edit checks." Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at
544. Of the three problems identified by the Commissioner as causing this situation, two
could be ameliorated by simplification: (1) "information incorrectly introduced into the
system by staff at the district [local] office level" and (2) "data processing problems cen-
trally." Id. In short, the system did not work because it could not handle the information it
was required to process. See note 29 supra.
'9See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra. Illinois dropped federal administra-
tion of its optional supplement partially because SSA could not make timely adjustments in
supplementary benefits when recipients' circumstances changed. Washington Star, Aug. 19,
1975, at A-6, col. 4 (capital special) (remarks of Ill. Dep't of Pub. Aid official). See also
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abandoned federal administration of their mandatory supple-
ments. 60 Responsibility for providing care for the aged, blind, and
disabled has thus become less of a federal matter during the past
three years.
Congress, intending to create a simplified system, built a pro-
gram that is more complex than the one it replaced. There can
now be two classes of recipients per state receiving benefits accord-
ing to two different formulas. 61 The type of plan that finally
emerged is also less amenable to the centralized automation that
was the initial goal of federalization. 62 In short, the federal gov-
ernment has not been able to make mandatory payments accu-
rately and efficiently because of their complexity. As the Social
Security Administration has emphasized, these difficulties are not
susceptible to improved procedures because they are inherent in
the basic legislation. 63
Hearings on H.R. 15580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 5, at 3607 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Appropriations for 1975] (ex-
change between Senator Eagleton and Comm'r Cardwell).
r0 The five states are Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Utah. Compare
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED: SUMMARY OF STATE SUP-
PLEMENTATION AND MEDICAID DECISIONS, (AUG. 16, 1974), at 5, 9, 16-17 [hereinafter 1974
STATE SUMMARY], with 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 8-9, 15, 26-27. Two
states-Mississippi and Vermont-changed from state to federal administration of their
mandatory supplements during July, 1974. Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 91
(information supplied by Comm'r Cardwell). This, however, took place before the prob-
lems with the administration of SSI became widely known and before the other five states
dropped federal administration.
81 Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 771 ("discriminatory 'two tier' system of in-
come supplementation"). One class-those "grandfathered" into SSI from the old pro-
grams-may receive higher benefits under the superseded public assistance formulas while
new applicants may get only the basic federal payment. Most states have attempted to equal-
ize the treatment of pre-1974 and post-1973 recipients through the creation of optional
supplements, yet wide disparities still exist. See 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at
1-35; House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 286 (experience
shows mandatory recipients receive higher average payments than the newly-enrolled). Al-
though much can be said for not reducing benefits of pre-1974 recipients (see, e.g., 1973
Senate Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 11, at 7-12 (statement of Senator Long)), there is
a surprising lack of commentary on the inequitable treatment of new recipients. For one
explanation why Congress legislated this discriminatory scheme, see Hearings on Second
Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1975, supra note 26, at 838 (statement of Comm'r Card-
well).
62 Implementation of the requirement for mandatory State supplement pay-
ments to "grandfathered" cases . . . has been beset with difficulties of great pro-
portions, particularly in those States for which these supplements are federally administered.
Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 93 (statement of Chairman of Nat'l Council of
State Pub. Welfare Adm'rs (Am. Pub. Welfare Ass'n)) (emphasis added).
63 Develbpment of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 5, 13 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
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There are four basic solutions to this problem. First, Congress
could allow the mandatory supplement program to dissipate of its
own accord. This would occur in one of two ways: either by the
death or change in circumstances of those presently receiving such
benefits, or by the voluntary movement of recipients from man-
datory to optional supplementation-a contingency unlikely to
occur in the near future. 4
Second, if Congress were less patient, it could abolish the man-
datory supplementation requirement altogether. This proposal
would not only vastly simplify administration, but also end the
discriminatory treatment of post-1973 recipients. States would then
be free to distribute payments according to current needs rather
than pursuant to superseded requirements of the former public
assistance programs. Although this solution has received influential
support, 65 Congress might be reluctant to make such a major
change that could reduce benefits to hundreds of thousands of
recipients.
Third, Congress could hasten the end of mandatory supple-
ments by changing the conditions under which they are made.
Presently, a state must make these payments to those individuals
who would receive higher benefits under the old plans.6 6 Legisla-
tion, however, could allow a state to end its mandatory program
once the average level of optional supplements available to all
mandatory recipients became greater than the average level of all
individual mandatory payments. Although some recipients would
be adversely affected, most would be protected against a decrease
in benefits. This proposal strikes a reasonable balance between
administrative necessity and recipients' needs.67
6' Estimated schedules on the termination of mandatory supplementation programs do
not appear to exist. As of the middle of 1976, however, no jurisdiction has been able to
end the payment of these benefits. Compare 1974 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 60, at 1-20,
with 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 1-35. Because of the high payments and spe-
cial needs provisions of the adult programs (see 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at
1-35), it is possible that states will have to pay mandatory supplements for a decade to
come.
'5 The SSI Study Group, a high-level panel chosen by then HEW Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger to evaluate various aspects of the program, has made this recommendation.
See DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SE-
CURITY AND THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE ON THE SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM 40-41 (1976) [hereinafter REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP].
Social Security Commissioner Cardwell agrees with this proposal. See House Hearings on
Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 304-05.
"See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
17 The Supplemental Security Income Amendments of 1976 (H.R. 8911) would make
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Fourth, Congress could change the formulas by which man-
datory supplements are calculated. It makes little sense to have two
completely different methods of determining benefits for each
state when Congress intended to create a system less subject to
state-by-state variations. 68 It is also illogical to retain the old, com-
plicated method of calculating mandatory supplements when that
system was specifically rejected in determining the basic federal
payment. This is especially true since the mandatory supplement
formulas are basically incompatible with the centralized bureau-
cracy that was assigned to administer SSI. One simplified method
would make the average of a recipient's three highest monthly
benefits in 1973 the mandatory supplement payment. Thereafter,
reference to pre-1974 formulas would be unnecessary. This solu-
tion would make these supplements easier for SSA to administer
without significantly affecting the level of recipients' benefits.
Moreover, it would make federal administration more attractive to
the states since SSA has special expertise in making flat-grant pay-
ments. This solution might therefore arrest the trend towards state
administration of mandatory benefits.
III
OPTIONAL SUPPLEMENTS
In addition to the mandatory benefits, states may make addi-
tional grants known as optional supplements. 9 Under the current
a minor change in the conditions under which states are obligated to pay mandatory sup-
plements. Currently, recipients are entitled to these benefits until either death or loss of
SSI eligibility; they do not lose this right even when their current payments are higher
than their December 1973 income (this often happens when recipients voluntarily give up
mandatory supplements in order to receive higher optional benefits). Therefore, SSA and
the states must keep certain records on former mandatory recipients in the unlikely event
that they will again become eligible for these payments. The 1976 SSI Amendments, how-
ever, would eliminate this problem by ending individuals' entitlement whenever they first
let these supplements lapse. Furthermore, the bill would end eligibility in other situations,
e.g., when a recipient moves from the state responsible for providing these benefits. See
H.R. 8911, supra note 9, at§ 13.
68 Your committee believes that the basic Federal assistance benefits provided
under its bill represent a realistic attempt to establish uniform national minimum
standards of assistance in . . . the adult... programs. These new Federal benefit
levels are higher than the current levels of assistance in many States and, conse-
quently, considerably lessen the wide variations from State to State which now
exist and which are frequently criticized as inequitable and as contributing to the
continuing shift of population to large urban areas.
1971 HousE REPORT, supra note 7. at 199.
69 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.2001-.2090 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. V
1975).
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system, a state has complete freedom to establish its own require-
ments as long as it administers the program itself.70 Should a state
elect federal administration, it may still retain any provisions it
chooses, although it is somewhat limited with respect to basic eligi-
bility and income provisions. 71 Hence, federally-administered op-
tional benefits can present almost the same range of complexity as
mandatory ones, and they can be just as difficult to administer
centrally.72 Because of operating difficulties, all of the states that
have added optional supplements during the past two-and-a-half
years have chosen state rather than federal administration.73
Simplification would reduce some of these problems since the
key to streamlining SSI is standardizing the manner in which pay-
ments are calculated. Reduction in the number of factors used to
determine eligibility and benefit levels would decrease the amount
of information that SSA would need to collect, verify, process, and
store. Payments could therefore be made with greater speed and
accuracy and at less cost.7 4
The Social Security Administration may make some changes
toward streamlining SSI without congressional approval. It has al-
ready taken one step in this direction by limiting to five the
number of living arrangements that a state may recognize in cal-
70 20 C.F.R. § 416.2005(c) (1976).
71 If SSA administers a state's optional supplement, the state must apply the same
eligibility requirements as those employed for the basic federal payment, except that it may
employ a higher income disregard (20 C.F.R. § 416.2025(c) (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382e(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975)), and it may impose a residency requirement (20 C.F.R.
§ 416.2035(a) (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975)).
Despite these restrictions, a state may elect to recognize additional factors not used to
calculate the federal base payment. For example, it may wish to use five living arrange-
ment variables instead of the three that are recognized to determine the basic federal
benefit (see notes 75-77 and accompanying text infra), or it may consider such additional
factors as whether a recipient's residence has cooking facilities (see note 81 infra).
72 See Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 13 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
7' These states are Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota,
Utah, and Virginia. Compare 1974 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 60, at 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 16-18,
with 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 6, 9, 13, 19, 22, 26-27, 29. Four others-
Delaware, Maine, Montana, and Vermont-established optional supplements during July,
1974 and chose federal administration. Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 91 (in-
formation supplied by Comm'r Cardwell). Since that time, however, no state has opted for
federal administration of either old or new optional programs. Compare 1974 STATE SUM-
MARY, supra note 60, at 1-20, with 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 1-35.
74 The experience with SSI indicates that the high number of variables-criteria for
determining eligibility or payment amounts-in federally-administered optional supple-
ments have created opportunities for error and increased administrative costs. See House
Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 318 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell). See also Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 132 (standardization decreases
paperwork, produces savings, reduces errors).
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culating a federally-administered optional supplement,15 and SSA
could further reduce this number.7 6 Such a regulation would im-
prove operating efficiency as well as have a beneficial side effect
for recipients. A number of states presently base the calculation of
their optional supplements on a wide range of living arrange-
ments; verification of these variables, however, causes an unneces-
sary and objectionable invasion of privacy.77 If fewer arrangements
are used to determine payments, the government will need corres-
pondingly less information.
Congress, of course, could legislate more fundamental
changes. For example, it might allow SSA to administer only uni-
form optional supplements that would be available to all recipients
(except those hospitalized over long periods).7 8 Even more than the
basic federal SSI payment, these unchanging supplements would
be relatively simple and inexpensive to make, as well as largely im-
mune to error. 9 Moreover, this recommendation conforms to
Congress's original intent to have the federal government handle
only flat-grant benefits.81 Less sweeping legislation could give SSA
the authority to refuse to administer provisions that require an ex-
cessive amount of information, lack general applicability, create
needless distinctions among recipients, or call for intrastate varia-
75 20 C.F.R. § 416.2030(a)(2) (1976). See also House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976,
supra note 18, at 253-54 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).76 See Part IV C infra.
77 North Carolina bases its state-administered optional supplements on 10 different
living arrangements, while New Jersey provides different federally-administered optional
benefits depending upon the number of people recipients choose to live with in a house-
hold. 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 18, 21. When such fine distinctions are
drawn, SSA (or the states) must enforce the law by seeking detailed information on matters
that should remain beyond the reach of government.
States complain that even five payment levels allowed to HEW in federally-admin-
istered optional supplements do not allow them to tailor benefits to all the variations in
living arrangements, and thereby prevent the development of alternatives to institutional
care. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 106, 274, 276, 279, 293, 517, 520-21
(statements of various state officials). Congress established SSI to furnish a minimum in-
come. Hence, it should be available without regard to place, or type, of residence in order
to allow recipients to make decisions uninfluenced by government interference. See text
accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
,s See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 38-40, 42-43.
7 5 See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
80 In general, it is anticipated that the same rules and regulations would be ap-
plied to both Federal and State supplemental payments with the only difference
being the level of such payments. However, the Secretary could agree to a varia-
tion affecting only the State supplemental if he finds he can do so without materi-
ally increasing his costs of administration and if he finds the variation consistent
with the objectives of the program and its efficient administration.
1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 200.
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tions. Special allowances that are available only to a few individuals
and require local administrative expertise should be made by local
agencies. 81 Congress could furnish states with additional financial
incentives to drop unnecessary provisions in their optional pro-
grams and elect federal administration.
Standardization of optional supplements would clearly make
SSI easier to administer. Yet it would also lead to inevitable hard-
ship for certain recipients, especially the blind and disabled who
have special needs. SSI does not currently provide special ("non-
recurring") aid82 similar to that available under Emergency Assis-
61 These recommendations are consistent with Congress's intent to create a program in
which the federal government would make flat-grant payments providing an income floor
and the states would administer relief for special needs. Accordingly, there are certain
types of provisions that should not be administered by SSA's highly centralized and auto-
mated bureaucracy. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12200(e) (West Supp. 1976) (spe-
cial allowance in federally-administered optional supplement for those who must purchase
all meals because they lack home cooking facilities); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.8(a)(1) (1974), as
amended, id. § 352.8(b)(1) (1974) (special payments for room and board for those not living
in own home authorized).
The California "meals out" allowance is available only to those with special needs, and
requires additional effort to administer, especially if SSA independently verifies all the
facts needed to determine eligibility. Furthermore, it is discriminatory since it is not avail-
able to those who have kitchens but are physically unable to cook (and therefore must
purchase meals outside of the home). But see Committee of the Rights of the Disabled v.
Swoap, 48 Cal. App. 3d 505, 122 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1975) (classification does not violate fed-
eral or state equal protection provisions). Before SSI, some counties that administered the
New York allowance made these payments only to those who lived with unrelated indi-
viduals, but not to those living with relatives. There is no justification for allowing such a
distinction based solely on the location of residence within a state at a certain period of
time. Moreover, it is unfair to penalize those who choose to live with relatives instead of
unrelated individuals since there is no evidence that the former have less need for the
allowance. See Woloszynski v. Lavine, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH)
19,347 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1974) (consent order entered).
These two examples illustrate the type of provisions that should not be administered
by the federal government. Both allowances are inconsistent with the flat-grant concept
since they authorize benefits to an extremely limited class of recipients. Furthermore, they
require additional information and are consequently more difficult to handle. Finally, both
create illogical classifications, States wishing to make such payments should do so as a part
of local emergency relief programs. See notes 82-94 and accompanying text infra.
12 Special or "nonrecurring" aid is short-term relief granted to cover specific emergen-
cies. Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 745. See also Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra
note 2, at 242-43, 245-46, 542, 546, 552-60, 801-02 (statements of various recipient advo-
cate groups); id. at 150-51, 156-57, 459-60, 506, 510 (statements of Reps. Holtzman,
Abzug, Solarz, and Ottinger); Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 688-89 (statement of
Exec. Dir. of N.Y. State-Wide Sr. Action Council).
Because SSI does not provide nonrecurring aid, a number of New York cases have
held that the state has a residual responsibility to provide this type of emergency assistance.
See, e.g., McWilliams v. Staszak, 82 Misc. 2d 546, 370 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1975) (utility shut-off);
Thomas v. Dumpson, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 903 (1975) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1974)
(eviction).
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tance to Needy Families with Children (EANFC)8 3 and state assis-
tance programs.8 4 But special relief will be needed85 if SSI becomes
more of a flat-grant system inherently incapable of furnishing aid
tailored to individual needs. 86 Hence, the crucial issue is which
level of government is better suited to deliver this type of aid.
The federal government currently administers SSI through a
highly-automated and centralized bureaucracy which is designed to
make relatively unchanging flat-grant payments. Under these cir-
cumstances, the system can administer benefits efficiently and
inexpensively,87 but it responds slowly to change. 8  Furthermore,
SSl does have a form of short-term interim relief known as Emergency Assistance to
Adults (EAA). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). EAA authorizes (1) advances in
benefits up to $100 for financial emergencies to presumptively eligible individuals awaiting
final determinations; and (2) full benefits for up to three months to presumptively disabled
claimants. It does not, however, provide nonrecurring aid for special needs, and it has been
criticized on other grounds as well. See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 747-48
(EAA covers only claimants, not recipients, who fail to receive checks); Future Directions, pt.
7, supra note 2, at 654 ($100 cannot cover month's living expenses and is available only
once).
83 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970). EANFC authorizes short-term emergency aid for children
in families. For a full discussion of this program, see Note, Meeting Short-Term Needs of Poor
Families: Emergency Assistancefor Needy Families with Children, 60 CORNELL L. Rev. 879 (1975).
84 See, e.g., 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 397.1-.9 (1976), implementing N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW
§§ 303-309 (McKinney 1976). For criticism of this statute and its implementing regulations,
see Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 654 (statement of SSI Alert-Action Comm. of
Yonkers Branch of Westchester County (N.Y.) Legal Aid Soc'y).
'5 For examples of SSI recipients needing nonrecurring relief, see Development of SSI,
vol. 2, supra note 2, at 460 (elderly diabetic needing expensive special diet eats for half a
month and literally starves until next check); Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 643-44
(widower with cancer, arteriosclerosis, diabetes, arthritis, and heart condition needs money
to travel to clinics); id. at 644 (double amputee loses housekeeper services).
86 Ozawa, supra note 49, at 34. Dias v. Chang, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,545 (Hawaii Cir. CL Jan. 31, 1975), held that the state of Hawaii must pro-
vide payments to individuals whose own resources could not provide a minimum standard
of decency and health. The opinion stated that the SSI flat-grant system was appropriate
only as a starting point for determining needs and that the state had an additional obliga-
tion to make case-by-case reviews of recipients' circumstances. In other words, Dias impli-
citly recognized the inherent limitations of the straight-benefit approach in providing for
all the income needs of recipients. Also see In re Lee (Smith), [1976] 2 Pov. L. REP. (CCH)
23,468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1976) (state has responsibility to those for whom SSI flat-
grant benefits do not provide a minimum standard of need).
It is neither feasible nor wise to fix the benefits of every person at a level that would
adequately provide for the most destitute. Hence, some have suggested that Congress scrap
flat-grants and return to the calculation of individual budgets to determine payments. See,
e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 333, 506, 551 (statements of Reps. Corman,
Solarz, and Rangel). A better solution, however, is to establish a referral system: if re-
cipients received benefits from the many other assistance programs to which they are enti-
tled, they could put together an "integrated package" to meet even extraordinary needs.
Consequently, the return to individual budgets would be unnecessary. See id. at 363, 366
(statement of Nat'l Ass'n for Retarded Citizens).
87 The same agency that administers SSI also makes Social Security retirement pay-
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the Social Security Administration is subject to the federal govern-
ment's strong desire for fiscal accountability and control,89 a factor
that further encumbers the system. 9° Given these limitations, it is
unlikely that SSI will ever be able to respond as rapidly as the
ments. The latter program spends an amount equal to approximately 2.1% of benefits for
administrative costs (House Hearings on Appropriationsfor 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 317),
and has an error rate of approximately .2% (Senate Hearings on Appropriations for 1975,
supra note 59, at 3610). SSI, by contrast, spends an amount equal to approximately 7.6% of
benefits to operate (House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at
300-01, 316), and has an error rate of approximately 25% (id. at 292). See notes 16-19 and
accompanying text supra. The discrepancy between the statistics for the two programs
stems in part from the more complicated nature of SSI. See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP,
supra note 65, at 190. Unlike Social Security payments, SSI benefits often fluctuate as re-
cipients' income and circumstances change. If Congress simplifies SSI, the federal govern-
ment will be able to make payments accurately and at less cost since automated and cen-
tralized systems can administer flat-grant benefit programs effectively.
8
' See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 710, 712, 713-14 (statement of member
of Passaic County (N.J.) Welfare Bd.). This commonly-shared observation has prompted
suggestions that the administration of SSI should be either returned to the states, or that
SSA should decentralize its operations, which presently require information to be sent to
one national center, in order to speed service to recipients. See, e.g., Administration of SSI,
vol. 2, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Alameda County (Cal.) Mental Health Ass'n);
Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 750-54 (statement of Comm'r of W. Va. Dep't of
Welfare); id. at 790 (letter from Independent Study Goup of Bay Shore (N.Y.) to Senator
Church).
Courts have also recognized that centralized systems are slow, especially in the context
of EANFC. See, e.g., Adens v. Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Even though cen-
tralization may be the "crux" of SSI's problems (see Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note
2, at 37), Congress should not decentralize the program or return responsibility to the
states. Instead, it should authorize reimbursement to localities that administer the type of
aid that requires quick delivery: interim and nonrecurring relief. SSA could then concen-
trate on making the flat-grant basic federal payments, a task in which reliability (not speed)
is the important factor.
8 Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 41 (both Congress and Executive Branch
have long-standing concern for accountability); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at
1002-03 (accountability is traditional part of American system of government).
90 Both SSA and its critics acknowledge that the federal government's concern for re-
ducing fraud and keeping track of expenditures has impeded the system's ability to deliver
benefits quickly. See, e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 26 (SSA asks questions
first and pays later, whereas states pay first); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at
1002-03 (requirement of accountability slows down payments); Future Directions, pt. 8,
supra note 2, at 752 (SSA's "constipated computers" engage in too much checking before
authorizing payments). Therefore, many have made suggestions to make SSI more respon-
sive and less accountable. See, e.g., Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 37, 42 (pre-
sumptive eligibility provisions should be liberalized to furnish more interim relief); Future
Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 978 (replacement checks should be issued within 24 hours).
Even SSA has adopted this approach in order to streamline the administration of SSI. See
notes 201-04 and accompanying text infra.
Although many have looked to Washington to take over all responsibility for public
assistance, the experience with SSI indicates that the federal government will not deliver
benefits as quickly as the states partially because of this concern for accountability. There-
fore, Congress should authorize reimbursement to localities that deliver nonrecurring or
interim aid to recipients of "federalized" public assistance programs such as SSI.
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states to changes in recipients' particular needs.
Since speed is essential for the delivery of nonrecurring aid,
the states, which have demonstrated that they can process pay-
ments quickly,9' should undertake this obligation. 92 Congress could
encourage local assumption of this assistance by furnishing finan-
cial incentives on a matching or other appropriate basis as it did for
interim relief.93 Under this system, both the states and the federal
1 Some states, less concerned about fiscal accountability than the federal government,
have developed systems that can deliver benefits to recipients within a matter of hours. See
Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 752 (West Virginia processes AFDC applications
within 24 hours).
92 Congress intended that states administer such relief:
[lI]t is customary in many states to take into account, on a case-by-case basis,
certain special needs of some . . . aged, blind, or disabled people who are in
unusual circumstances leading to financial needs that are not met under the gen-
eral standards established by the States. . . . Your committee believes, however,
that the responsibility of the Federal Government in administering a State pro-
gram of supplemental payments should generally be limited to administration of a
basic uniform payment which does not vary according to such "special need" and
is the same throughout the State and that any additional "special need" payments
should be generally made directly by the State. Thus, a State could also pay an
additional amount on an individual case-by-case basis to recompense the special
needs cases. This additional payment would have no effect on either the amounts
payable under the Federal program or the federally administered State uniform
supplementation program.
1971 HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 200. See Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at
53-54 (exchange between Rep. Rangel and Comm'r Cardwell).
The President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, while recommending
the enactment of a nationally administered and financed universal cash supplement plan,
noted that the states should provide aid to those "who have exceptional emergency needs
or who suffer a sudden large drop in income" since the federal government "cannot ex-
tend aid as rapidly and as sensitively as a locally-administered assistance program." THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COIMISSION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, POVERTY
AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 70 (1969).
At least one state has enacted a special needs statute. In 1976, Pennsylvania amended
its Public Welfare Code to broaden the conditions under which the state will provide SSI
recipients with cash assistance for nonrecurring emergencies. Furthermore, legislation also
increased the number of people who may receive this aid by expanding eligibility for op-
tional benefits. See Act No. 28, § 1, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50 (Purdon) (to be codified as PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432 (Purdon)). SSA administers Pennsylvania's optional supplement
(see 1976 STATE SUMMARY, supra note 33, at 25), and the state makes the special payments.
93 The Interim Assistance Reimbursement program (IAR), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) (Supp.
V 1975), authorizes federal reimbursement to states for interim aid furnished to SSI ap-
plicants subsequently determined eligible. Hence, it alleviates the financial distress caused by
long delays in the arrival of initial payments. About half the states have participated in IAR
by signing required agreements with HEW. See H.R. REP. No. 1296, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2678, 2679. This program expired on
June 30, 1976, but was subsequently extended on a permanent basis. See Act of July 14,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-365, § 1, 90 Stat. 990. Congress could use IAR as a model for the
reimbursement of states delivering nonrecurring relief.
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government would administer the type of aid that they handle
best.9
4
If the calculation of optional (as well as mandatory) supple-
ments were simplified to make them more susceptible to central-
ized processing, it would be preferable for the federal government
to administer all supplemental payments. 95 Since SSA already has
94 A recent analysis labeled the federal takeover of the administration of special needs
payments as the cause for SSI's continuing operating difficulties. See REPORT OF SSI STUDY
GROUP, supra note 45, at 38-40, 190. SSA should not attempt to deliver nonuniform ben-
efits because states are in a better position to administer this type of assistance. Neverthe-
less, there have been some proposals to include nonuniform special allowances in the basic
federal payment. The most important of these is H.R. 6769, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2
(1975),formerly introduced as H.R. 4308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1975) [hereinafter H.R.
6769] which would authorize a "Supplementary Housing Benefit" to those making special
application who must spend more than a third of their income on rent (or other shelter
expenses). See note 139 infra.
Some form of rent assistance is necessary, but it is inappropriate to include this type of
provision-one that authorizes payment only under restricted conditions to a narrow
class-in a centrally-administered flat-grant plan. Moreover, the inclusion of other special
allowances, such as one for fuel costs (see Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 189-90),
would in effect reintroduce the discredited calculation-of-individual-budgets method which
SSI was supposed to eliminate. Any attempt to run a program similar to the old needs-
based system from SSA's highly automated and centralized bureaucracy will result in the
slow, expensive, and inaccurate delivery of benefits as the experience with federally-
administered supplements unfortunately illustrates. See notes 58-63, 72-74, 87-90 and ac-
companying text supra. Furthermore, whenever Congress has departed from the concepts
of standardization and uniform payments in SSI, such as in the living arrangement and
resource areas (see Parts IV A, IV C infra), it has posed significant administrative problems
for SSA. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 86-87 (statement of Chairman of
Nat'l Council of State Pub. Welfare Adm'rs (Am. Pub. Welfare Ass'n)). Hence, special al-
lowances of any type should not be included in the federal basic payment. Money for
nonrecurring needs can be delivered by states pursuant to federal reimbursement (see note
92 supra), or through increased optional supplements geographically adjusted for variations
in the cost of living (see note 139 infra).
The ultimate (and most costly) approach to the delivery of nonrecurring relief calls for
a substantial increase in the basic federal payment in order to allow recipients to meet most
emergencies. It has been argued that this solution would be less expensive in the long run
for two reasons. First, it would eliminate state supplementation (see note 102 infra), thereby
saving overhead costs. Second, it would make people self-sufficient so they can contribute
to the growth of the economy. See Development of SS1, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 811-12 (state-
ment of Exec. Dir. of West Side (N.Y.) Community Alliance).
95 Congress envisioned federal administration of all supplementary payments:
Although . . . there may be a continuing need for State supplementation of
the new Federal assistance programs, it would appear generally desirable that such
supplementation be provided through [SSA]. This would avoid unnecessary dupli-
cation of administrative costs, would permit the States to take advantage of the
improved methods and procedures which the bill would require, and would tend
to foster national uniformity in the operation of assistance programs.
1971 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 199. If SSA assumes the costs of delivering all the
supplements, states could use their administrative resources to make special needs pay-
ments.
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the resources and recognized expertise in machine processing,96
the incremental administrative costs would not be great.9 7
Clearly, Congress could compel the states to surrender their
administration of optional supplementary payments either by coer-
cion (withholding federal money under other programs98 or using
the commerce and supremacy clauses of the Constitution99 ) or by
persuasion (financial incentives' 00 ). But a complete federal take-
over may be undesirable at the present time because SSA has not
yet demonstrated its ability to administer the program within its
present requirements.' Through legislative and administrative
simplification, however, SSI can achieve the promise of economies
of scale and greater uniformity. The alternative-the present com-
plicated and inequitable system of state-by-state and intrastate
variations-can only continue to aggravate current problems. Had
Congress gone one step further and assumed more responsibility
for this type of assistance, it could have avoided many of the dif-
ficulties. In this case, reform of the system was not as sweeping as it
should have been.'0 2
'6See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 7.
97 SSA estimates that it could administer benefits to two million more SSI recipients
with little incremental cost. See House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note
18, at 317 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
9' Congress has already adopted this approach for SSI. See note 55 supra.
99 Because of the number of recipients affected and the size of payments involved,
Congress could declare public assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled to be a matter
affecting interstate commerce, and exclusively regulate it under the supremacy clause.
100 Presently an added financial commitment by the federal government might be
politically unfeasible. In 1975 SSA estimated that it would cost $1.3 billion a year to assume
the cost of all state supplementary benefits. Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 20
(statement of Comm'r Cardwell). This figure, however, would not measure the full price of
such legislation since it would still leave wide disparities in benefits from state to state, and
it is unlikely that low-benefit jurisdictions would allow federal tax dollars to reimburse the
more generous ones without some added incentive.
One argument can be made for federal assumption of a larger share of the costs of
SSI. Congress initially expected 6.2 million recipients in January of 1974 and 7.1 million in
FY 1975. See 1971 HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 147. The number of recipients, how-
ever, has never gone above April 1976's total of 4,353,580 (see Soc. SEc. BULL., Sept. 1976,
at 64 (Table M-23)), and it is not expected to reach 4.6 million until the end of FY 1977
(House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 285). The federal gov-
ernment, therefore, is operating a program substantially smaller than the one originally
envisioned, so the addition of new financial responsibilities would not necessarily make SSI
more expensive than Congress originally intended.
"
1 See Part I and notes 58-63, 73 and accompanying text supra.
102 The AFL-CIO has presented one of the most far-reaching and costly solutions to
optional supplementation problems: raise the basic federal payment to eliminate the need
for state supplementation. Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 766 (letter of AFL-
CIO Dir. of Dep't of Legislation to Rep. Fulton).
PROPOSAL FOR SSI REFORM
IV
BASIC FEDERAL PAYMENT
Congress hoped to solve the traditional problems of welfare
administration with the enactment of SSI. It therefore designed
the program to be both simple and inexpensive to administer. Al-
though many of the problems that plagued the superseded state
plans were eliminated, some difficulties remain, and there are a
number of measures that either Congress or SSA could adopt to
streamline the administration of SSI and to aid recipients.
A. Living Arrangement Variables
Three living arrangements are recognized in calculating the
basic federal SSI payment. First, those who maintain their own
home and who are completely responsible for their own well-being
receive the full SSI benefit reduced only by their countable
income. 10 3 Second, individuals who receive food and shelter while
living in households of others suffer a one-third reduction in
benefits.10 4 Third, recipients who are in medical facilities through-
out any month and who have more than half the cost of their care
covered by Medicaid receive a maximum of twenty-five dollars per
month.'0 5 If Congress wanted to simplify this aspect of the pro-
gram, it could eliminate the second and third variables which have
already come under sustained attack from many concerned
groups. 106
The one-third reduction provision attempts to promote equal-
ity among recipients by reducing the benefits of those who receive
significant amounts of in-kind income. By employing an easily-
administered conclusive presumption, Congress partially elimi-
nated the need to make time-consuming and costly determinations
of the value of food and shelter on a case-by-case basis.' 07 Many,
1o3 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.410-.412 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (Supp. V 1975).
1.4 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b) reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 27,406, 27,407-08 (1973) (interim
regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,911, 48,912 (1975)), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)
(Supp. V 1975).
1('s 20 C.F.R. § 416.231(a)(2) (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(B) (Supp. V
1975).
'
6 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 65-66, 70-71 (repeal of one-
third reduction recommended); cf. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 11 (proposal to
limit reduction to one-fifth rejected as incomplete solution).
'
7 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 737 (statement of Senator Taft);
Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
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however, have severely criticized this aspect of the program as
creating hardship by limiting benefits 0 8 and thereby forcing peo-
ple into institutions.0 9 Hence, some advocate a return to the
periodic valuation of in-kind income."10 Such a step would be un-
desirable for two reasons. First, it would be virtually impossible to
administer equitably because of the inability to make precise de-
terminations of the value of food and shelter."' Second, the pres-
ent verification process would cause an undesirable invasion of
privacy by the government.
Insofar as the one-third provision simplifies administration
and protects privacy, it is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless,
if only the receipt of cash were counted as income, the elimination
of the one-third requirement could be justified on other grounds.
It would make SSI easier to administer because it would decrease
the number of variables recognized in calculating payments. SSA
would then have less need to investigate recipients' living habits
and sources of support. Moreover, since there would be no reduc-
tion in benefits for free receipt of food and shelter, this change
would encourage, although not require, private and family aid to
recipients. Furthermore, the elimination of the one-third rule
would remove present impediments to free association between
recipients and their relatives and friends. Most important, how-
ever, the one-third reduction is inconsistent with the concept of SSI
as an income floor. The old categorical plans attempted to tailor
recipients' payments to individualized needs. Under these pro-
grams, it was logical that benefits were reduced by the value of
in-kind transfers since their receipt decreased need. SSI, on the
other hand, was established to supplement inadequate incomes
with flat-grant payments and allow recipients freedom to manage
their own affairs with a minimum of government interference."12
108 See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 690 (statement of Exec. Dir. of N.Y.
State-Wide Sr. Action Council); Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 591 (statement of
Exec. Bd. member of Nat'1 Council of Sr. Citizens).
109 See, e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 323, 328 (statement of Nat'l
Ass'n of Soc. Workers); id. at 353-54, 359-60 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n for Retarded Citi-
zens). The institutionalization of recipients is often medically unnecessary (id. at 564) and is
substantially more expensive than the payment of full benefits (id. at 139, 748).
110 See, e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 158 (statement of Rep.
Holtzman); Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 769 (statement of Nat'l Ret, Tchrs. Ass'n
& An. Ass'n of Ret. Persons).
"I SSA has already reviewed the problem of valuing in-kind income and has yet to
find a "better substitute" for the one-third rule. bevelopment of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at
40 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
112 The "basic purpose" underlying the program is "to assure a minimum level of in-
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Because the one-third provision requires SSA to intrude on the
privacy of individuals, it runs counter to the program's basic
philosophy. 13
Aside from the level of benefits," 4 no other aspect of SSI has
attracted as much criticism as the one-third rule. Congress has
implicitly recognized that the application of this provision is not
desirable in all situations. It has recently created a narrow excep-
tion to prevent reductions in benefits when certain disasters force
recipients to live in households of others."15 For the reasons cited
above, Congress should eliminate the reduction altogether.
Congress may still wish to count in-kind transfers as income in
order to prevent some people from receiving both SSI benefits and
substantial contributions of food and shelter. Legislation could al-
leviate the existing problems of imprecise and costly valuations by
partially disregarding the receipt of food, shelter, and other in-
kind items. Here Congress has two alternatives: it could create an
aggregate disregard 1 6 for food, shelter, and common household
expenses or three separate ones for each of these categories. "1 The
first alternative is preferable since it would be easier to administer.
Furthermore, the government has little interest in how recipients
allocate their money among the three categories. Whichever
course Congress chooses, these new disregards should be set at
levels high enough to eliminate difficult valuation problems, but
not so high as to allow the undeserving to retain eligibility.
Congress could also eliminate the third living arrangement
come" to the aged, blind, and disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (1976). Furthermore, pay-
ments are to be made "under conditions that are as protective of people's dignity as possi-
ble." Id. § 416.110(c).
"'
3 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65. at 32, 43, 71.
114 See, e.g., hearings cited in note 2 supra.
115 Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2125, 90 Stat. 1920 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
116 A disregard is a provision that partially or totally excludes the value of items from
counting against income or resource limitations such as those contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a) (Supp. V 1975). SSI has a number of disregards. See notes 145, 172, 176 infra.
"I Although the application of the one-third rule has been uneven (see Development of
SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 92, 138-39), SSA now does not apply the reduction if a recip-
ient pays his pro rata share of expenses. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 11. If a
recipient alleges that he contributes his proportionate share, SSA must value the total
monthly cost of food, shelter, and common household purchases, and divide this figure by
the number of people in the household. Consequently, the government must collect and
verify much information concerning individuals' living habits and arrangements. See House
Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 330 (statement of Comm'r
Cardwell). The creation of disregards to avoid the inherent problems of valuation would
therefore protect recipients' privacy.
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variable: the twenty-five dollar benefit for recipients in Medicaid-
supported facilities. Similar to the one-third requirement, this pro-
vision embodies an easily-administered conclusive presumption.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to administer-SSA often cannot make
timely reductions, thereby requiring recovery of overpayments
from recipients. 1 18 Furthermore, the twenty-five dollar provision
also causes hardship for those institutionalized for short periods
since reduced SSI payments prevent recipients from meeting their
continuing obligations. For example, individuals are often released
from Medicaid facilities only to find that they have been evicted for
nonpayment of rent since the twenty-five dollar benefit cannot
cover this expense. 119 Hence, this reduction increases dependence
on costly institutional care.' 20 In order to prevent windfalls to
some, the Secretary of HEW could give SSA authority to reduce
payments to twenty-five dollars after a finding that the recipient
will be institutionalized for longer than a specified period such as
three or six months. 12 1 This proposal would not only eliminate
paperwork, but also promote the independence of temporarily in-
stitutionalized individuals.
The variables discussed above are not the only troublesome
aspects of the basic federal payment in this area. There are two
miscellaneous SSI provisions that either reduce or terminate pay-
ments, and therefore unduly restrict recipients in choosing their
'18 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 33.
"
9 Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 746 (statement of Exec. Dir. of Nat'l Council
on Aging). See id. at 804-05 (letter from Pres. of Am. Nursing Home Ass'n to Senator
Church).
120 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 260, 263 (statement of Natl Ret.
Tchrs. Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons).
121 Periods of either three or six months appear to be reasonable compromises be-
tween the competing considerations of providing aid to maintain the independence of
temporarily institutionalized recipients and preventing unjust enrichment to those hos-
pitalized indefinitely. The House Ways and Means Committee and the SSI Study Group
favor the three-month alternative (see 1976 HouSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 9-10, 20;
REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 33, 42-44), while New York has adopted
the six-month period (see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 30 3 (I)(g) (McKinney 1976)). The New
York provision authorizes state assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled for "[h]ousehld
expenses essential to the maintenance of a home, in the case of a person whose supple-
mental security income benefit has been reduced because he has been placed in a medical
facility." Id. The statute further requires that
[w]ithin forty-five days following placement in such a facility, the social services
official shall determine whether, and payments under this subdivision shall not
continue unless, such person is expected to remain in such a facility for less than
one hundred eighty days following the reduction in such benefits;
Id. (emphasis added). See also Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 260, 263 (Nat'l Ret.
Tchrs. Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons advocates four-month period).
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residence. The first of these is section 1616(e) of the Social Security
Act, which reduced benefits to those living in facilities that could be
covered by Medicaid, but which did not meet certain standards.122
The intent was to prevent federal support of sub-standard
institutions 123 which is a praiseworthy goal. Yet this section has no
place in a flat-grant income maintenance plan because it was ad-
ministratively infeasible, 124 and it is inappropriate for the federal
government to tell people how and where they should live. SSI was
created to provide economic security, not to direct the lives of the
aged, blind, and disabled. 25 Eligibility and payments should hinge
on recipients' income and resources, not on extraneous factors.' 26
Moreover, section 1616(e) was bad social policy: by effectively pre-
venting recipients from living in certain types of facilities, it halted
development of alternative arrangements for those not requiring
full institutional care.' 27
Congress, however, recently passed Public Law 94-566, effec-
tive October 1, 1976, which repeals section 1616(e) and devises a
new scheme to upgrade facilities.'22 This legislation requires states
to establish and enforce standards by October 1, 1977, for institu-
tions, homes, or group living arrangements where "a significant
number" of recipients reside or will reside.'2 9 Such guidelines must
govern admission policies, safety, sanitation, and civil rights protec-
tion and be "appropriate to the needs of [SSI] recipients and the
character of the facilities involved . . . . 13 Administrative provi-
sions of the law require states to (1) reveal the standards and en-
forcement procedures they have established and a list of all waivers
granted and violations discovered; 13' and (2) annually certify their
122 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(e) (Supp. V 1975).
'23 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 65; Development of SSI, vol. 2,
supra note 2, at 351 (statement of Nat'!l Ass'n for Retarded Citizens); id. at 703 (statement of
Comm'r of N.J. Dep't of Institutions and Agencies).
124 REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 65-66.
125 SSI regulations state that "[n]o restrictions, implied or otherwise, are placed on how
recipients spend the Federal payments." 20 C.F.R. § 416.110(c) (1976). Section 1616(e), of
course, did not technically tell individuals how they may spend their SSI checks, but it had
this practical effect since it reduced benefits if people chose to live in certain facilities.126 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 65-66.
121 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 96, 145-47, 263, 346, 350-52, 700-03,
809-10 (statements of various people and organizations testifying before Congress).
128 Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 505(c), (e), 90 Stat. 2687, deleting 42
U.S.C. § 1382e(e) (Supp. V 1975).
129 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382e(e)(1) (Supp. 1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 20, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 505(d), 90 Stat. 2687).
13 0 Id.
131 Id. § 1382e(3)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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compliance to the Secretary of HEW. 132 Finally, Public Law 94-566
reduces SSI benefits whenever recipients live in facilities not meet-
ing the new guidelines.133 This legislation unfortunately does not
lessen excessive government management of recipients' lives since
it only decentralizes responsibility for establishing residence stan-
dards. Although Congress has encouraged state-adopted alterna-
tives to unnecessary institutional care, it has not yet abandoned
federal paternalism since the new law still requires SSA to monitor
recipients' living arrangements. Congress should help improve
conditions in facilities serving the aged, blind, and disabled, but not
as a part of an income program, and certainly not at the expense of
recipients. In this respect, Public Law 94-566 does not represent an
improvement over old section 1616(e).
The second miscellaneous aspect of the program is the "in-
mate of a public institution" provision. As a general rule, SSI
should be available to all people without income and resources.
There is one group, however, who should not receive benefits:
those incarcerated in penal institutions or committed to mental
hospitals. These people should not be eligible because the public
has already assumed responsibility for meeting all their needs. Ac-
cordingly, SSI legislation prohibits payments to "an inmate of a
public institution."'' 3 4 HEW, apparently disregarding the ordinary
meaning of the word "inmate," has interpreted this provision
broadly to deny eligibility to those residing in group facilities serv-
ing four or more people that are under some form of state
control.' 35 Yet many who fall in this category need a periodic in-
come supplement such as SSI. Furthermore, HEW's interpretation
has terminated benefits to those living in community homes,
thereby preventing the "deinstitutionalization" of those not requir-
ing full medical care. 136 Therefore, similar to old section 1616(e),
the "inmate of a public institution" provision discourages ex-
perimentation with alternative living arrangements and improperly
restricts recipients' freedom of choice.
Congress has recently mitigated the harshness of HEW's in-
l21 Id. § 1382e(e)(3) (Supp. 1976).
'Id. § 1382(e)(4) (Supp. 1976).
134 20 C.F.R. § 416.231(a)(1) (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V
1975). Recipients are challenging the constitutionality of this provision. See Wilson v. Edel-
man, 542 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1976).
'
3
' See 20 C.F.R. § 416.231(b) (1976). For criticism of this aspect of the program, see
Development of SSf, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 96, 347, 353, 734-35, 745-46.
'
3
' See. e.g., Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 347, 353 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens).
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terpretations by excluding publicly-operated community residences
serving no more than sixteen people from the definition of a "pub-
lic institution.' 37 This amendment strikes a good compromise be-
tween the competing considerations noted above' 38 that have made
resolution of this problem such a difficult matter.
The changes suggested in this Note would almost eliminate the
need for SSA to monitor individuals' living arrangements. 39 They
would also effectively raise benefits, yet there would be large off-
setting savings in overhead costs and decreases in processing times
because of less paperwork. 40 More important, these proposals
would lessen the objectionable government intrusion into the lives
of recipients, and they would be consistent with the concept of the
right to a minimum inicome without regard to place of residence.' 4'
Such recommendations would therefore promote the indepen-
dence and dignity of recipients, a goal that SSI was originally de-
signed to foster.'
42
137 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382(e)(1)(A), (C) (Supp. 1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 20,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 505(a), 90 Stat. 2686). For a similar solution, see Development of
SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 347, 353 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n for Retarded Citizens).
138 See notes 107-21 and accompanying text supra.
"' Many seeking to aid recipients have suggested changes that would increase the need
for government supervision of recipients' residences. Representative Holtzman, for in-
stance, introduced legislation to create a special allowance primarily to aid those who live in
urban areas where rents are high. H.R. 6769, supra note 94, § 2, would authorize a
"Supplementary Housing Benefit" of up to $50 per month to those recipients whose rent,
mortgage payments, real estate taxes, and heating expenses exceed a third of their annual
income. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 149-50, 155, 191-93 (statements of
Rep. Holtzman). See also id. at 236, 237, 377, 421-22, 463, 506, 510, 543, 545 (similar
housing allowance proposals of various groups and other New York Representatives in
Congress).
Since some recipients must spend three-quarters of their income for rent (see id. at
506), clearly some type of relief is needed. A special allowance, however, is not the best
solution. This proposal would require SSA to collect, verify, and store even more informa-
tion about matters outside the scope of official inquiry than is presently required.
In order to pay for extraordinary needs without intruding on the privacy of recipients,
Congress and the states could join together to provide more money through federally-ad-
ministered, uniform, optional supplements. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
If the level of benefits were more adequate, individuals would then have enough to meet
their particular needs. See notes 94, 102 supra. States could then take advantage of the
existing provision that allows up to three geographical cost-of-living variations per state in
optional payments made by SSA. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.2030(a)(1) (1976). Additional aid,
therefore, could be targeted to regions where particular costs (or costs in general) are
higher.
"'°See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 132 (statement of Chairman of Nat'l
Council of State Pub. Welfare Adm'rs (Am. Pub. Welfare Ass'n)).
4I See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 43.
14 See note 112 supra.
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B. Unearned Income
Current law counts interest, dividends, Social Security and
other government benefits, and payments from pensions or an-
nuities against SSI income limitations. 143 These amounts are clas-
sified as "unearned,"'144 so that after an initial twenty-dollar per
month disregard, 145  there is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in
benefits.' 46 Consequently, SSA is required to collect, verify, and
process information on small amounts of income that may have an
insignificant impact on recipients. These provisions unduly compli-
cate administration and discourage saving. Therefore, SSI, a pro-
gram which should encourage independence and savings, instead
promotes reliance on government programs and discriminates
against the frugal.' 4 7
Congress could simplify the operation of SSI and encourage
individuals to save by adopting any of several proposals. First, it
could increase the twenty-dollar disregard. This option, however,
would tend to shelter only Social Security payments in most cases
unless the disregard were set at an extremely high level. There-
fore, it would do little to simplify the program if the exclusion were
not large enough to reach the other types of income that are dif-
ficult to monitor.' 48 Second, legislation could create separate disre-
143 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1130, .1138 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2) (Supp. V
1975). SSI legislation also excludes both earned and unearned income if it "is received too
infrequently or irregularly," provided that it does not exceed $30 (earned) or $60 (un-
earned) in any calendar quarter. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975), implemented by 20
C.F.R. § 416.1157 (1976). Unlike SSI, the Food Stamp program completely excludes some
Social Security and other government payments. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(ii)(e) (1976).
144 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1130, .1138 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2) (Supp. V
1975).
145 20 C.F.R. § 416.1165 (1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
146 Earned income, on the other hand, receives more favorable treatment. The first
$85 per month ($65 per month if $20 has already been excluded from unearned income)
and one-half of the remainder is excluded for purposes of determining eligibility. 20
C.F.R. § 416.1167, implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975). There are also
special work incentives for the blind and disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1169, .1171, .1731
(1976), implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1975). For a description of
these incentives, see House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note 18, at 338-39
(statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
147 Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 697 (statement of Rep. Griffiths). In one
case an aged widow was denied SSI because she had $2,000 in the bank-$500 over the
limit-even though she owned no car and had only a $15,000 house. This woman
penalized herself by saving, because she could have become eligible by spending the $500
on a car or a more expensive home. Id.
148 During December 1975, the last month for which statistics are available, 52.7% of
all SSI recipients received Social Security benefits. This group's average monthly payment
under the latter program was $130.01. Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1976, at 92 (Table Q-20).
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gards or an aggregate shelter for the various types of non-Social
Security income so that SSA would not have to keep track of them
constantly. As in the in-kind income area, these new disregards
could be set at levels to make SSI easy to administer and to exclude
those who do not need benefits. Third, Congress could adopt a
more sophisticated approach by converting applicants' "unearned"
income into "annuities" and assuming that they would liquidate
their holdings to meet their individual needs. This scheme would
amortize savings over life expectancies, and only the amount pre-
sumed spent by this formula each year would count against the
income limitation. Even though this proposal might initially involve
slightly more paperwork than current law requires, once the "an-
nuity" had been calculated there would be no need to make ad-
justments. Congress could decide that, for the sake of adminis-
trative convenience, changes in recipients' circumstances, either
favorable or adverse, would not affect the initial computation.
Emergency aid could be furnished by localities for those whose
savings were unexpectedly cut off or dissipated.
Since these three options would simplify the administration of
SSI, savings in operating costs would partially offset resulting in-
creases in benefits. Furthermore, all the proposals would encour-
age individuals to save in any form to protect themselves in the
future. These suggestions would make the program more equitable
since they would not significantly penalize those who had saved
during their lifetime; under these recommendations, accumulated
savings would at most reduce benefits, not bar them altogether.
Gifts, inheritances, charity, in-kind transfers, and other items
are also defined as "unearned" income.149 Hence, their receipt
causes a dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits over the initial
twenty-dollar disregard. The operating costs involved in monitor-
ing such transfers and in making appropriate changes in benefits
are high. Aside from considerations of administrative efficiency,
these provisions create a strong disincentive for individuals to help
recipients by making small charitable gifts. 150 Furthermore, the
dollar-for-dollar reductions severely handicap both private organi-
zations and even public agencies in furnishing assistance. For ex-
Consequently, if the level of the disregard were not raised above this amount, this proposal
would not significantly simplify the administration of SSI.
149 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(a), reprinted in 38 Fed, Reg. 27,406, 27,407 (1973) (interim
regulation; 40 Fed. Reg. 48,911, 48,914 (1975)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1132, .1136 (1976), im-
plementing 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
... See Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 716, 718 (statement of Senator Taft).
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ample, SSI legislation originally considered as income all in-kind
assistance provided by private nonprofit retirement homes and
other similar institutions. This created a situation of diminishing
returns: subsidies furnished by these organizations to resident re-
cipients reduced SSI benefits, thereby requiring larger subsidies,
which in turn further reduced payments eventually to zero. 1' 1
Congress solved this problem by passing Public Law 93-484,152
which generally provides that the value of support and mainte-
nance will not count as income as long as the cost is borne by the
nonprofit home or institution itself or by another nonprofit or-
ganization. This law, however, does not shelter assistance from
charitable organizations to noninstitutionalized recipients. 153
Congress has recently passed a major reform in this area. Pub-
lic Law 94-566 provides that state or local assistance based on need,
furnished to individuals or institutions, will not reduce the basic
federal payment.' 54 Furthermore, such aid need no longer be fur-
nished in cash, 55 as old law required. 56 To further improve the
program, Congress could pass comprehensive legislation shelter-
ing all assistance provided by state or federal statutes and by chari-
table institutions.' 5 Moreover, it could establish a partial disregard
for gifts up to a certain amount.158 Although it might want to keep
"'See H.R. CONF. RE'. No. 1407, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5995, 5996; Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 717 (state-
ment of Senator Taft).
152 Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-484, § 4, 88 Stat. 1460 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1975)).
1'3 The Supplemental Security Income Amendments of 1976 would remedy this im-
portant omission. See H.R. 8911, supra note 9, at § 16.
154 Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 505(b), 90 Stat. 2686 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1382a(b)(6) (Supp. 1976)).
155 Id.
156 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(a) (Supp. V 1975).
15' Current law already authorizes a limited number of exclusions from income. First,
20 C.F.R. § 416.1145(a) (1976), shelters payments authorized by federal statute where ex-
clusion is required by law. For a list of these benefits, see id. § 416.1146. (These are also
excluded as resources if not commingled. Id. §§ 416.1210(j), .1236.) Second, 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1145(b) (1976) authorizes a small number of other exclusions, such as those for
tuition scholarships (defined in id. § 416.1153) and foster care payments (defined in id.
§ 416.1159). Third, even though SSI legislation on its face counts the receipt of nonrecur-
ring aid (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(b)(6), 1382e(a) (Supp. V 1975)), 20 C.F.R. § 416.2001(a)
(2) (1976) shelters this type of emergency relief. Despite these provisions, many other im-
portant benefits, such as housing assistance, vocational rehabilitation, and veterans pay-
mfients still count against the income limitations. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2,
at 189, 354, 359, 369-70, 371-72, 407, 413-14, 419, 686, 772.
158 Current law counts the receipt of gifts, inheritances, prizes, and other items as
income in the month of receipt and as resources in succeeding months. The effect of
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the "earned" versus "unearned" distinction to preserve a work in-
centive,1 59 it should not impose a 100 percent "tax"'60 on this type
of aid. This is especially true if Congress and the states are not
prepared to raise benefits to more adequate levels. A complete tax
on all forms of "unearned" income is not only difficult to adminis-
ter, but also fosters dependence on public aid, a result SSI was
designed to prevent.
C. Resource Limitations
The largest number of errors in the administration of SSI
occurs in the enforcement of the law's resource provisions. 6 1 This
task involves a great expenditure of time and manpower, but rarely
affects the outcome of claimants' applications. 62 In this area, as
well as others, simplification is the solution. 163
Former law allowed a recipient to exclude the value of his
disregarding these acquisitions would be to immediately treat them as resources. Other
suggestions in this Note, discussed in Part IV C infra, would further disregard these items
as resources should they fall into one of the enumerated categories: (1) automobile; (2)
personal effects; or (3) household goods. These suggestions, taken together, streamline the
operation of SSI by ignoring transfers that are difficult to monitor and which often have
little practical effect on eligibility or benefits.
H.R. 8911, the Supplemental Security Income Amendments of 1976, offers limited
reform in this area. This bill, by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(E) (Supp. V 1975),
would permit HEW by regulation to exclude from income gifts and inheritances that are
not readily convertible into cash. H.R. 8911, supra note 9, at § 9. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 19, at 6-7. Another proposal, H.R. 7033, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1975), would
amend 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) to disregard up to $200 a month in in-
trafamily cash or kind transfers to recipients. Under this bill, these disregarded amounts
would not reduce benefits. See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 346, 353 (state-
ment of Nat'l Ass'n for Retarded Citizens); id. at 451-57 (statement of Rep. Koch). Both
bills would reduce the inherent problems in recordation and valuation of income and de-
serve serious attention from Congress.
"9 Since "earned" income is treated more favorably than "unearned" income (see notes
143-46 and accompanying text supra), Congress has created a financial incentive to work.
After the initial disregard (see note 146 supra), every dollar of "earned" income reduces
benefits by only 50 cents. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975). If Congress adopted a
similar 50% reduction for "unearned" income, it would reduce the incentive to work since
receipt of "unearned" income would then be just as beneficial to the recipient as receipt of
"earned" income. Not everyone agrees that SSI should have a work incentive. See, e.g.,
Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 639, 642-43 (statement of Community Org. Dir.
of Phila. Corp. for Aging).
"I The word "tax" denotes the percentage reduction in benefits caused by receipt of
income.
16 Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 38-39 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
162 Id. at 10 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell); REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note
65, at 68.
"'Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 38-39 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell);
Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
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home and appurtenant land in calculating resources as long as
their value did not exceed a "reasonable" amount, 64 determined
to be $25,000 current market value ($35,000 in Alaska and Ha-
waii).' 65 This provision had been one of the most troublesome as-
pects of the program for SSA to administer. It left little room for
regional variations in real estate values; 66 it ignored equity value,
which is a better measure of an individual's resources; 67 the de-
termination of assessed value had proven difficult to make;168
HEW had not adjusted the upper dollar limits of the disregard to
keep pace with inflation or the general appreciation in land
values; 69 and finally, this limit presented individuals with the un-
164 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). For an examination of the treatment of
homes under OAA, see Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 266 (statement of Nat'l
Ret. Tchrs. Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons).
165 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212(a) (1976). SSA deserves credit for solving one of the most
inequitable aspects of the valuation of a "home." Initially, the definition of "homes" did not
include "farms." Therefore, a person who was eligible in all other respects could live on a
"farm" with a total assessed value of $3,800 and still not be eligible for benefits. When the
problem was brought to its attention SSA quickly corrected this glaring inequity by regula-
tion. See Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 584-86. For a discussion of a similar prob-
lem, see id. at 580 ("land poor" in rural areas are ineligible for SSI).
116 Numerous groups had suggested that HEW should have allowed for more variation
in the maximum value of homes. See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 767 (state-
ment of Nat'l Ret. Tchrs. Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons); Future Directions, pt. 7, supra
note 2, at 615, 621 (statement of staff att'y of Nat'l Sr. Citizens' Law Center). But see Future
Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 756 (statement of Comm'r of W. Va. Dep't of Welfare).
167 Congress established the resource test to require people to pursue alternative
means of support before falling back on SSI. The presently-used market value method,
however, fails to recognize that encumbered goods cannot be liquidated at full value to
provide for living expenses. Hence, those who favor the equity approach argue that the
only purpose of the current method of valuation is to prevent the appearance of affluence.
See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 767 (statement of Nat'l Ret. Tchrs. Ass'n &
Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons). Commissioner Cardwell has candidly admitted that this con-
cern motivated SSA to adopt the market value method. See House Hearings on Appropriations
for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 303.
AFDC regulations used "gross market value" without deduction for encumbrances to
determine the value of resources. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975). The District of
Columbia Circuit, however, has declared this provision invalid as contrary to the intent of
the Social Security Act. See National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 647
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
168 See House Hearings on Appropriations for 1975, supra note 13, at 410-11 (great dispar-
ity between assessment and market values); Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 767
(property values depend upon market conditions and other factors not subject to precise
determination).
169 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 266 (statement of Nat'l Ret. Tchrs.
Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons). The low level of this disregard has made some recip-
ients ineligible for benefits because inflation revalued their homes above the cut-off. De-
velopment of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 22 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
1977) PROPOSAL FOR SSI REFORM
enviable choice of keeping their homes or receiving benefits.17 0
SSA could have solved these problems by adjusting the upper
limits of the disregard to exclude the value of all (or all but the
most expensive) homes. 17 1 It did nothing, however, so Congress
recently passed legislation to completely disregard homes. 72 This
approach, already adopted for the Food Stamp program, 173 makes
SSI substantially easier and less expensive to operate. Moreover,
it also makes the program more attractive to the recipient since
the new law furthers the purpose behind the original legislation: to
promote the independence and dignity of the aged, blind, and
disabled.' Furthermore, this change does not extend SSI to the
undeserving. There is little danger that potential eligibles will con-
vert substantial assets into a home to qualify for benefits since the
law's low income and resource limitations do not allow an indi-
vidual to maintain an expensive house or pay local taxes.17 5
Congress or SSA should also consider changing the law with
regard to automobiles, personal effects, and household goods.
Presently, the market value of these items is not counted against
the resource limitation as long as they are within certain confines
set by HEW.' 76 Their valuation, of course, is a difficult task that
170 One group noted that potential eligibles have three options: sell their property to
be eligible, refuse benefits they desperately need, or cheat. Future Directions, pt. 8, supra
note 2, at 689 (statement of Exec. Dir. of N.Y. State-Wide Sr. Action Council). In order to
alleviate all of the problems associated with the former homestead disregard, California has
established a general assistance program to aid those who would qualify for SSI but for the
ownership of their home. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12152(b) (West Supp. 1976);
Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 304 (statement of Dir. of L.A. Dep't of Soc.
Serv.).
171 Increasing resource limits to simplify SSI has received some, but not much, support
from those appearing before Congress. See, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 787
(letter from Pres. of N.Y. & N.J. Council of Soc. Sec. Dist. Off. Employees to Senator
Church).
172 See Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-569, § 5, 90 Stat. 2700 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(b)). This new law embodies an approach that has gained support from those testify-
ing before Congress (see, e.g., Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 767 (statement of.Nat'l
Ret. Tchrs. Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons)), as well as others studying the program (see,
e.g., REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 67-68).
173 Food Stamp regulations exclude "[t]he home and lot normal to the community" in
determining the resources of a household. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(4)(iii)(a) (1976).
174 See Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 724 (statement of Nat'l Ret. Tchrs. Ass'n
& Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons); Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 584 (statement of
Coordinator of Knoxville, Tenn. Sr. Aides Program).175 House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 303 (statement of
Comm'r Cardwell). See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 97, 107 (homestead max-
imum limit rejects "self-regulating economic process").
176 The limitation for household goods and personal effects considered together is
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not only makes SSI more costly to administer, but also increases the
time needed to process applications. 7 '
In this area there are a number of possible solutions. Similar to
the recently-enacted homestead exemption,' 7 8 Congress could
amend current law to completely exclude the value of these items
from counting against the resource limitation, 179 or SSA might
raise the level of the individual disregards to accomplish the same
result. Alternatively, it could permit recipients to satisfy this re-
quirement by making oral declarations that they do not have goods
of "unusual or exceptional value."' 80 These solutions would be ad-
vantageous to both government and recipient. Although these re-
sources can be liquidated, most of them have little or no market
value. Those that do, such as cars, are necessary, and therefore will
not be sold.' Total disregard accomplished by any of these
methods would significantly reduce the paperwork that contributes
to operating difficulties. Equally important, it would lessen the ex-
tent of the federal government's intrusion into people's lives, and
thereby remove one of the more distasteful aspects of means-tested
assistance programs.
Some have suggested that Congress allow recipients more dis-
cretion in the allocation of their resources. One proposal, for ex-
ample, would permit those who do not own a car (and who there-
fore cannot use the $1,200 vehicle disregard' 82 ) to hold higher
$1,500 and that for cars is $1,200. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1216(b), .1218(b) (1976).
177 See note 162 and accompanying text supra. This proposal would also eliminate
other problems with the tabulation of resources, such as unrealistically high appraisals of
property (see Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 592), the use of market value instead
of recipients' equity (see id. at 615-16, 621; note 167 supra), and the unfairness of valuating
heirlooms (see Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 767). Food Stamp regulations com-
pletely exclude the value of "one licensed vehicle, household goods . . . and personal
effects" from the calculation of the resources of a household. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(4)(iii)(a)
(1976).
178 See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
M,0 See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 68-69.
180 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 267 (statement of Nat'l Ret. Tchrs.
Ass'n & Am. Ass'n of Ret. Persons). SSI may have in effect adopted oral declarations for
these goods by administrative practice since current law is too difficult to enforce. Even if a
change will have no practical effect, Congress should still amend SSI legislation. No pro-
gram should contain unrealistic statutory requirements. Furthermore, the Social Security
Act, like any other law, should be enforced as written; otherwise, administration of SSI will
become uneven and subject to abuse.
181 The value of an automobile will be totally excluded from the calculation of re-
sources if it is either (1) used for employment or medical treatment (20 C.F.R. § 416.1218
(b) (1976)), (2) modified for the transportation of handicapped persons (id.), or (3) essential
for self-support (id. § 416.1224(d)).
18 2 See id. § 416.1218(b) (1976).
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amounts of other assets. 8 3 If enacted, this recommendation would
remove some of the unfairness inherent in the present system.' 84 A
better solution would be to eliminate the individual categories of
disregards and establish a single aggregate limit for all noncash
property such as automobiles, personal effects, and household
goods. 185 By adopting this approach, Congress would both stream-
line the administration of SSI and allow recipients greater freedom
in the disposition of assets. The current scheme encourages indi-
viduals to spread their resources among various categories in order
to take maximum advantage of the disregards. An aggregate ap-
proach, on the other hand, would permit recipients to group all
assets in one category and still qualifyi for the total disregard. It
would therefore tend to decrease needless government influence
on personal decisions.
D. Verification
Under the declaration method of eligibility determination (or
self-declarations), applicants' or recipients' statements, unless "spot
checked," are subject to further investigation only if they are "in-
complete, unclear, or inconsistent" on their face.' 86 Prompted by
HEW, states have already experimented with this system for the
adult categories with encouraging results. 187 Congress, however,
18 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 548 (statement of Citizens' Comm. on
Aging of Community Council of Greater N.Y.).
184 See example cited in note 147 supra.
"'
85 See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 377 (statement of Am. Jewish Cong.);
Development of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 22 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell); Future
Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 697 (exchange between Senator Church and Rep. Grif-
fiths).
8
' See 45 C.F.R. § 205.20 (1970) (superseded). These regulations for OAA, AB,
APTD, AABD, AFDC, and Medicaid provided:
[Whenever] statements of the applicant or recipient are incomplete, unclear,
or inconsistent, or where other circumstances in the particular case indicate to a
prudent person that further inquiry should be made, and the individual cannot
clarify the situation, the State agency will be required to obtain additional substan-
tiation or verification. In such instances, verification is obtained from the indi-
vidual or the agency's records or from the public records, or with the individual's
knowledge and consent, from another source.
45 C.F.R. § 205.20(a)(3) (1970). Furthermore, the regulations required "spot checking":
when the rate of incorrect eligibility decisions in a sample exceeded "a 3 percent tolerance
level," HEW required a 100% verification of those factors identified as causing the problems
for as long as the difficulties persisted. Id. § 205.20(c)(5)(iii).
187 For a history of the use of self-declarations, see NATIONAL STUDY SERVICE, INC.,
FACTS ABOUT WELFARE SERIES, REPORT No. 2, at 1-11 (1969), reprinted in G. COOPER, C.
BERGER, P. DODYK, M. PAULSEN, P. SCHRAG & M. SOVERN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
AND POVERTY 307-10 (2d ed. 1973). Prior experimentation with self-declarations indicates
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specifically rejected its use for SSI.188
Accordingly, SSA initially attempted to verify every aspect of
each SSI application independently. 89 It soon discovered, how-
ever, that the process of corroboration was more complex, time-
consuming, 90 and expensive 9' than it had originally anticipated,
and that it caused long processing delays that plagued the pro-
gram. 192
Since results with complete verification have not been prom-
ising, 93 Congress should reconsider the use of self-declara-
tions194 to speed the initial delivery of benefits and cut adminis-
trative costs. The only objection to the declaration system is that it
would initially allow overpayments and payments to ineligibles. But
the annual redetermination provision, which requires a periodic
reexamination of eligibility, 195 would correct these difficulties to
some extent.' 96 Furthermore, the institution of the self-declaration
that this system has achieved results similar to those of the traditional investigation
method. Future Directions, pt. 13, supra note 2, at 1158 (statement of Regional Rep. of Nat'l
Council on the Aging). Although the declaration system has not been used extensively in
the welfare field, the concept is similar to the self-assessment approach of the federal in-
come tax.
188 42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(1)(B) (Supp.. V 1975) prohibits the use of the declaration sys-
tem to determine eligibility for SSI. See CLAIMS MANUAL, pt. 12, supra note 2, at
§§ 12107-12109.5 (Dec. 1976).
189 See Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1021 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
190 Hearings on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1975, supra note 26, at 820 (state-
ment of Comm'r Cardwell); Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supora note 2, at 13-14 (statement of
Assoc. Soc. Sec. Comm'r for Program Operations).
"I House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note 18, at 257 (statement of
Comm'r Cardwell).
192 Future Directions, pt. 7, supra note 2, at 639 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Work-
ers). See Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1002 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
193 In addition to being complex and costly, the traditional verification method has
been called "particularly onerous, needless, and wasteful where the aged, blind, and dis-
abled are concerned." COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC
WELFARE SYSTEM 21 (1970). Furthermore, it has been criticized as preventing "a great
many people who are truly eligible for benefits from applying for them." Future Directions,
pt. 13, supra note 2, at 1158 (statement of Regional Rep. of Nat'l Council on the Aging).
194 The use of the declaration system may not prove successful when benefits are
claimed on the basis of disability. Since the statutory definition is strict (see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975), implemented by 20 C.F.R. § 416.901(b)(2) (1976)) and the
standard is difficult to apply, there have been numerous disagreements between SSA and
claimants in this area. At one time 95% of all requests for reconsideration of new eligibility
decisions involved medical determinations of disability. Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2,
at 1017 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell). Superseded federal regulations for public assis-
tance programs specifically excluded the use of the declaration method for disability de-
terminations. 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(a)(3) (1970). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.901(c) (1976) (state-
ments of applicant alone are insufficient to establish disability).
195 20 C.F.R. § 416.222 (1976).
19' For additional material on redeterminations, see CLAIMS MANUAL, pt. 13, supra note
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procedure would reduce both the intrusion on privacy that verifi-
cation causes197 and the stigma attached by the questioning of one's
honesty by the government. 98
Since SSA is developing the capability to electronically verify
the amount of Social Security and other government benefits, 199 it
is unlikely that Congress would ever accept the declaration method
for all aspects of SSI.2°° But in other areas, this system is a good so-
lution to administrative problems that have affected the program.
If Congress does not adopt self-declarations, SSA could par-
tially remedy the problem by eliminating full investigation of
statements. It has already taken some steps in this direction, espe-
cially with automobile registrations,2 °' unearned income,2 °2 and
age determinations, 20 3 and it could continue to experiment in this
area.20 4 Either approach-use of the declaration method or limited
2, at §§ 13400-13436 (Nov. 1976); House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra
note 18, at 298-99, 330-31, 425, 458-59. Some have even suggested that Congress should
allow SSA to accept self-declarations in the redetermination process. See, e.g., Development of
SS/, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 500, 502 (statement of Rep. Downey of N.Y.); id. at 801 (Nas-
sau Action Coalition of SSI Recipients and Advocates position paper).
197 There is little invasion of privacy when SSA checks public documents such as au-
tomobile registrations or tax assessors' records. The problem is more serious, however,
when the government investigates details of homelife (especially when it must verify the
number of people residing in a particular household), or when it contacts people in the
applicant's or recipient's community, including relatives, neighbors, friends, or merchants.
See Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 659 (statement of Chief of Law Reform of
Phila. Community Legal Servs., Inc.).
198 "The social stigma attached to welfare is the unfortunate by-product of the case-
method of investigation to determine eligibility. ... Ozawa, supra note 49, at 34. See
Development of SSI, vol. 2, supra note 2, at 663 (people prefer to suffer without SSI rather
than be investigated and stigmatized).
'99 See Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 22, 30, 92, 98.
20 Superseded federal regulations that required experimentation with self-declarations
allowed states to continue to verify information on Social Security benefits. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.20(a)(3) (1970). Such rules evidence the government's reluctance to completely aban-
don independent checking for these types of easily-verified payments.
201 SSA district offices verify automobile registrations only where there is a question as
to the value of a vehicle (such cases comprise less than 5% of the total). Hearings on Second
Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1975, supra note 26, at 850 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
SSA believes that this "shortcut" procedure reduces processing time and does not "materi-
ally affect the accuracy of SSI eligibility determinations." Id.
202 Whenever information about unearned income is "not readily available," SSA per-
sonnel may check "post-adjudicatively"; i.e., verify after processing an application. SSA, for
example, may accept individuals' statements "as to amount, source, and frequency of pay-
ments ... unless there is reason to doubt them." CLAMis MANUAL, Pt. 12, supra note 2, at
§ 12357(c) (July 1976). This may be done when "it appears that evidence is not available
and the individual has cooperated in trying to obtain it ... as long as there is no evidence
or facts to cast doubt on the. .. allegations." Id. § 12357(c)(1).
203 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.806 (1976).
204 SSA is moving towards "postverification" of selected items "where experience has
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verification-would be better than the current time-consuming and
costly procedures.
V
FIXED SUM REIMBURSEMENT AND
RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENTS
Simplification of two other aspects of SSI would also improve
the operation of the program. The present procedures by which
SSA determines states' liability to the federal government and the
method of recovery of overpayments are unnecessarily cumber-
some and counterproductive. Simple changes, however, may al-
leviate these difficulties.
A. Reimbursement
One impediment to continued federal administration of sup-
plementary benefits has been the present formula for computing
the reimbursement of HEW by the states. Under the current sys-
tem, states pay for the exact amount of benefits disbursed unless
an exception, such as the hold harmless rule,20 5 applies. Hence,
HEW and the states settle their accounts after the review of pay-
ments made to individuals. 20 6 Because of the many errors made by
SSA during the first three years of the program's operation in
optional and mandatory supplements, the determination of state
and federal financial liability has become a long and drawn out
task. 20 7 This system has led to a continuing dispute between SSA
and almost every state utilizing federal administration, 208 not only
as to the amount of money at stake, but also as to the method of
determining liability.20 9 Understandably, this has been one of the
shown the needs of the applicant can be balanced against the integrity of the program."
Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1021 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell).
215 See note 22 supra.
206 States choosing federal administration of their optional and/or mandatory supple-
ments sign contracts with the Secretary of HEW which, among other things, provide for
the manner of reimbursement and establish procedures for the determination and settle-
ment of federal payment errors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.2001-.2090 (1976), implementing
42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. V 1975); REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 105-30.
207 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
2'See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
2 0 Three methods have been used to fix financial liability. The first is the case-by-case
approach, which was incorporated into contracts for calendar year 1974. States oppose this
method since they must meet the burden of identifying those cases where they are entirely
without fault. SSA agreed to scrap this system for the January to June 1974 period in favor
of the second approach-HEW audits. Under this method the HEW Audit Agency, with
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factors in the unfortunate trend away from federal administration.
Review of individual cases, however, is not the only method by
which the states and the federal government could determine their
respective financial liabilities. Congress could scrap the present sys-
tem and give the Secretary of HEW authority to contract with the
states on a different basis. For example, agreements could provide
for reimbursement in a fixed sum determined in advance by
federal-state negotiations. Such amounts could be based upon the
expected average payments to each class of SSI recipients and the
anticipated number of eligible recipients in each class, with an al-
lowance for a certain percentage of errors.210 In the case of op-
tional supplements, there could be a provision to reduce the
negotiated sum for any expected hold harmless payments. Finally,
as an added inducement to accept federal administration, there
could be an adjustment provision to reduce a state's liability in case
the actual number of recipients or size of average payments fell
below certain negotiated levels.
This type of fixed-sum reimbursement would accomplish two
objectives. First, it would remove the continuing source of friction
between SSA and the states. Once the parties signed an agreement,
state assistance, evaluates the accuracy of payments and the accounting of liability. States
prefer audits to the third method, SSA's Quality Assurance System. This program, now
contained in administration contracts, provides for review of a statistically-selected monthly
sample of cases by interviews with recipients and others. Although states have the right to
audit subsamples of their own choice, they dislike this method, partially because of known
inaccuracies and lack of opportunity to help develop the system. The SSI Study Group,
however, recommends the permanent adoption of a revised Quality Assurance System
audited and validated by HEW. See REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 105-30;
House Hearings on Appropriations for 1977, pt. 6, supra note 18, at 292-94 (letter from Comm'r
Cardwell to Rep. Ullman); Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 41-43 (summary of
HEW audit reports on SSI). For additional information on the Quality Assurance System,
see CLAIMS MANUAL, pt. 13,supra note 2, at §§ 13900-13970 (Sept. 1976).
210 State contracts for administration of supplements, after disregarding mistakes of
less than $5, make SSA fiscally liable for errors in excess of 5% for payments and 3% for
eligibility decisions. These are the same quality control measures that HEW seeks to impose
on the states for AFDC. REPORT OF SSI STUDY GROUP, supra note 65, at 109-10. See also
Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 77 (letter from Comm'r Cardwell to Rep.
Vanik).
Erroneous payments are the result of complex statutory and administrative require-
ments; therefore, it is logical that the flat-grant Social Security program has an extremely
low error rate of .2%. See note 87 supra. As Congress and HEW simplify optional and
mandatory supplements, states should expect improvement in payment accuracy and
negotiate decreases in contractual error tolerances. See note 18 supra.
A federal district court has found that the AFDC tolerance levels of 3% and 5% (see 45
C.F.R. § 205.41 (1975)) were arbitrarily established, and therefore invalid as inconsistent
with the Social Security Act. See Maryland v. Mathews, 415 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1976).
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states would not have to worry about paying for SSA's errors
or checking the accuracy of review procedures. Second, this ar-
rangement would place a greater incentive on SSA to make more
accurate payments because the federal government would be
responsible for errors above the agreed allowance. Negotiated
reimbursement agreements, therefore, could solve some of the
problems that have prompted states to administer their own sup-
plementary benefits.
B. Recovery of Overpayments
The large number of erroneous payments made during the
first three years of SSI's operation makes the issue of recoupment a
serious matter. SSA has already collected millions of dollars in
mistaken payments,2 1' and, bowing to strong congressional pres-
sure, it has announced its intention to continue these efforts.2 12
The law requires SSA to waive the recovery of erroneous payments
if the recipient was "without fault," and if such efforts "would
defeat the purposes of [SSI legislation], or be against equity or
good conscience, or (because of the small amount involved) impede
efficient or effective administration .... ,,213 Under this standard, it
has been estimated that eighty to ninety-five percent of the over-
payments are waivable.21 4 It would be inefficient, therefore, to re-
211 In making a determination whether to seek repayment, SSA first examines the size
of the mistake since it does not attempt to recover any amount under $45. If the error is
above this limit, and if the recipient is responsible for the mistake, it will seek recoupment.
In these cases, the only question is the manner of recovery. If the recipient is without fault,
however, the government looks at the expense of collection and the capability to repay
(although most are found able to do so since the government is willing to take installments
and tailor repayment). The burden of establishing an overpayment has been gradually
shifting to SSA. Recipients have a right to notice and a hearing before making repay-
ment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.535, .537-.538, .550-.570, .2045 (1976); CLAIMS MANUAL, pt.
5, supra note 2, at §§ 5595-5599.5 (Nov. 1976); Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at
26-27 (statement of Comm'r Cardwell); Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 1014 (state-
ment of Comm'r Cardwell); Miller, Supplemental Security Income Overpayments, 10 CLEAR-
INGHOuSE REV. 193 (1976).
212 SSA has been told that it should make the recovery of overpayments its "first prior-
ity." Administration of SSI, vol. 1, supra note 2, at 35 (statement of Rep. Gibbons). Accord-
ingly, Commissioner Cardwell has publicly stated that SSA will recover "wherever possible."
Washington Star, Aug. 16, 1975, at A-5, cols. 3-4 (Sat. morning).
213 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b) (Supp. V 1975), implemented by 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.550-.555
(1976).
214 See Washington Star, Sept. 7, 1975, at E-9, col. 2 (Sunday ed.). Although a Bureau
of SSI study estimates that approximately 22% of the overpayments can be recovered
(Washington Star, Aug. 20, 1975, at A-6, col. 1 (home final)), this figure represents a
maximum of what can be returned (see Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 19
(statement of Comm'r Cardwell)).
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view each case to find those few instances where money could be
returned. Furthermore, as Social Security Commissioner Cardwell
lamented, "we are living in the age of 'due process' .... 215 Vari-
ous courts have held that the fifth amendment requires notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before SSA may recoup mistaken
payments. 2 16
With these added constitutional requirements, SSA may spend
more in attempting to recover excess payments than it can
collect.2 1 7 In short, further efforts to rectify past payment errors
will burden already overworked Social Security field employees
and further decrease their capacity to handle existing problems. 21 8
Moreover, recoupment has already caused unnecessary hardship
on recipients. 219 Since limitations on income and resources are low,
the only practical means to recover overpayments is to offset
amounts from future checks. But recoupment of SSI benefits,
which were designed only as a floor,2 could reduce a recipient's
income below the minimum necessary to survive.2 2 ' Despite the
large amount still outstanding, Congress should authorize a blan-
215 House Hearings on Appropriations for 1976, supra note 18, at 259.
216See, e.g., Linley v. Philbrook, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH)
20,344 (D. Vt. Sept. 18, 1974) (temporary restraining order), 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 522
(1974). In this case SSA sent mailgrams to Vermont SSI recipients demanding refund of
overpayments and did not mention a right to a hearing. The federal district court there-
fore temporarily enjoined state and federal welfare officials from: (1) making further at-
tempts to recoup SSI overpayments without this notification; and (2) accepting voluntary
repayments in response to the constitutionally deficient mailgrams. See Washington Star,
Aug. 17, 1975, at A-1, col. 1 (Sunday ed.).
'
17 See Washington Star, Aug. 17, 1975, at A-6, col. 4 (Sunday ed.) (Assoc. Soc. Sec.
Comm'r for Program Operations admits that recovery process will probably cost more than
blanket waiver).
2"8 The case-by-case review of overpayments has been cited as one of the causes of a
serious decline in morale of SSA field workers. See, e.g., Washington Star, Sept. 7, 1975, at
E-9, col. 2 (Sunday ed.).
"
19 See Administration of SSI, vol. 3, supra note 2, at 36; Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra
note 2, at 38 ($2,000 bill for SSI overpayments made recipient depressed causing recom-
mitment to state mental hospital); Washington Star, Aug. 30, 1975, at A-5, col. 3 (Sat.
morning) (some who never applied for SSI received bills for overpayments); Washington
Star, Aug. 17, 1975, at A-1, col. 5 (Sunday ed.) ($1,460 in SSI checks deposited in
ineligible's bank pending unsuccessful attempts to repay almost caused loss of Medicaid).
220 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (1976).
221 In some cases SSI benefit levels are below the poverty level (see Future Directions, pt.
8, supra note 2, at 670), so recoupment often leaves recipients destitute. Not surprisingly,
many have spent overpayments just to meet essentials. See Administration of SSI, vol. 2, supra
note 2, at 38. This problem has prompted Senator Pell to propose legislation that would
allow SSA to withhold no more than 25% of each monthly check for repayments. See S.
985, supra note 30, at § 401; Future Directions, pt. 12, supra note 2, at 978, 1058 (statement
of Senator Pell). Presendy, there is no limit on recoupment deductions, but administrative
practice is to subtract small amounts over a long period of time. See note 211 supra.
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ket waiver of erroneous payments. SSA could then devote its re-
sources toward preventing the problems that cause overpay-
ments in the first place.
VI
SS[ AS A MODEL FOR "FEDERALIZATION"
The federal government's assumption of responsibility for
public assistance is an idea that has appealed to a broad spectrum
of opinion.222 It has even been considered the ultimate answer to
what has been repeatedly characterized as the "welfare mess." The
recent experience with SSI, however, suggests that improved ad-
ministrative methods alone cannot eliminate the traditional prob-
lems of slow, erroneous, and inefficient delivery of benefits-
simplification of statutory provisions is also necessary.
The transition from the adult categorical assistance programs
to SSI illustrates this point. As previously noted, Congress origi-
nally designed SSI as an easily-administered flat-grant system. It
retreated from this concept, however, because some categorical aid
recipients would have received lower benefits under the new pro-
gram. To remedy this situation, new legislation implanted all the
complicated aspects of the old assistance plans onto SSI through
the creation of mandatory supplements thereby preserving all the
individual calculations required by superseded law. This attempt to
ensure a steady, continuing level of benefits has caused many of
the initial difficulties with SSI.
There were strikingly similar difficulties in the "cashing out"
of the Food Stamp program. 223 The 1972 Social Security Amend-
ments initially made SSI recipients ineligible for Food Stamps,2 24
although it encouraged states to "cash out"-i.e., include the
"bonus value"225 of these coupons in optional supplementary pay-
222 See, e.g., Text of Platform Adopted by Republicans at Miami Beach 21-22 (Aug. 22,
1976), reprinted in 30 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. 2151, 2160-61 (1972) (text of 1972
Republican Party Platform "plank" on Welfare Reform); PUB. PAPERS: RICHARD NIXON:
1969, 639-41 (1971) (Pres. Nixon's Aug. 8, 1969 Address to the Nation on Domestic Pro-
grams); H.R. 6729, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Natl Welfare Rts. Org.'s Adequate Income
Act of 1971); N.Y. Times, July 7, 1976, at 14, col. 6 (resolution of Nat'l Govs. Conf.); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1976, at 45, col. 5 (speech of Vice Pres. Rockefeller); N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
1976, at 1, col. 8 (Govs. of N.J., N.Y., Pa. & Wis. to Pres. Ford); N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1976, at
1, col. 5.
223 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a description of the program,
see Note, Developments in Welfare Law---1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 892-911 (1974).
224 Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 411(a), 86 Stat. 1491.
225 Under the Food Stamp program, certified households pay only a fraction of the
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ments at federal expense.226 This scheme provided a simplified
plan for combining the adult categorical and Food Stamp pro-
grams. It worked to the disadvantage of some, however, since it
conclusively presumed that the value of the coupons to each re-
cipient was ten dollars per month (twenty dollars per couple), 227
even though it may have actually been more.
Congress changed this simple statutory scheme before SSI
went into effect by passing Public Law 93-86.228 This amendment
provided that recipients could continue to receive Food Stamps
for every month in which they received less in both federal and
state SSI payments than they would have received in December
1973 under the superseded programs plus the "bonus value"
of the coupons. 229 Thus, the law provided that states would have to
determine Food Stamp eligibility for thousands of recipients on a
case-by-case basis every month. This solution, like the mandatory
supplement provisions, ensured that no one would be hurt by the
change in programs because it required that entitlements be con-
tinually calculated in accordance with superseded law. Congress
has delayed the implementation of Public Law 93-86 four times,23 °
and it probably will never go into effect because the states have
complained that it is virtually impossible to administer.3 1 Con-
monetary face value of their monthly coupon allotments. 7 U.S.c. § 2013(a) (1970). Al-
though the size of the allotment depends on the number of members in the household (7
U.S.C. § 2016(a) (Supp. V 1975)), the percentage paid for the stamps is determined by the
household's combined income (id. § 2016(b) (1970)). The "bonus value" of Food Stamps in
general terms, therefore, is the benefit conferred by the program. Specifically, as applied
to SSI, the term "bonus value" means the face value of an individual's allotment received
in January 1972 reduced by the charge the individual would have paid for the stamps. See
42 U.S.C. § 1382e note (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-603, § 401(b)(3), 86 Stat. 1486).
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382e note (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 30,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 401(b)(1)(B), 86 Stat. 1486. For a more detailed explanation of
the "cash out" of Food Stamps for SSI recipients, see McInnis v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp.
381, 384-87 (D. Mass. 1975).227 See Social Security in Review, Soc. SEC. BuLL., Jan. 1975, at 1, 2.
228 Act of Aug. 10, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221.
229 Id. § 3(b), 87 Stat. 246 (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
230Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 8, 87 Stat. 956, postponed the im-
plementation of the individualized determinations required by Public Law 93-86 from
January 1, 1974 to July 1, 1974. Congress enacted further extensions to July 1, 1975 (Act
of July 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-335, § 1, 88 Stat. 291), July 1, 1976 (Act of June 28, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-44, § 3, 89 Stat. 235), and July 1, 1977 (Act of July 14, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-365, § 2, 90 Stat. 990).
231 The principle [behind Public Law 93-86] was an entirely reasonable one [to
ensure that no recipient suffered a decrease in benefits due to the transition to
SSI] but the complexities of administration caused the States to conclude that it
was unworkable. They were faced with making determinations of how much in-
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gress, however, did not postpone the implementation of manda-
tory supplements, even though they presented almost identical
problems of administration.
These two examples suggest that if Congress ever "federal-
izes" AFDC, it should not attempt to preserve the old method of
calculating benefits. In the two cases in which it has preserved
superseded provisions, Congress has created unworkable laws.
The experience with SSI and Food Stamps demonstrates that the
retention of periodic case-by-case determinations is impractical
and even counterproductive. If Congress wants to maintain recip-
ients' benefits in the transition to a new program, it should adopt
a simplified method 232 and discard the old formulas and provi-
sions.
CONCLUSION
Congress designed SSI to be a simple flat-grant program to
provide an income floor for aged, blind, and disabled Ameri-
cans.233 As such, it was not meant to take care of special needs,
preserve former benefits by incorporating old law, or influence
personal decisions of recipients. SS's initial problems, some of
which still plague the program, have been caused in large measure
by attempts to accomplish these inconsistent goals.
If SSI is ever to fulfill initial expectations, Congress will have
to simplify those aspects of the program that make it less amenable
to central administration and machine processing, and eliminate
the parts that are incompatible with the concept of a guaranteed
income plan. Furthermore, it must provide adequate financial in-
centives to the states for special needs relief which the federal
come applicants would have had under the rules of State welfare programs which
were no longer operative.
H.R. REP. No. 1081, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [19741] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3436, 3436. See Mdnnis v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Mass. 1975);
Future Directions, pt. 8, supra note 2, at 719-20 (Senator Taft says "onerous provisions" of
Public Law 93-86 "create an administrative monstrosity").
222 See Part II supra.
"I There is a trend towards simplification of public assistance programs here as well as
abroad. In this country, two events highlight this development. First, the enactment of SSI
evidences the concern over the complexity of rules governing income maintenance plans.
Second, more than half the states, including those with the largest number of recipients,
have adopted the flat-_grant method to determine the size of AFDC benefits. See Dep't of
Health, Educ., and Welfare, Press Release HEW-F21 (June 12, 1975). In Europe, Belgium,
Switzerland, and France are either studying or have undertaken attempts to simplify pro-
grams providing assistance to the needy aged. M. HORLICK, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY IN-
COME FOR THE AGED: A COMPARISON OF FIVE COUNTRIES 71-77 (1973).
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government is not well-equipped to render. Only with these
changes will SSI adequately solve the persistent problems of wel-
fare.
Clearly SSI will come under intensive public scrutiny in the
coming months. The new Administration has promised not only a
fresh emphasis on management of public assistance programs, 324
but also a welfare reform package this year.235 A review of SSI,
however, cannot come too soon. The severe hardships that the
program's current requirements impose on both recipient and tax-
payer makes reform one of the most urgent matters before the
new Congress and administration.
Gordon G. Chang*
234 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1976, at 12, cols. 3-4.
235 See, e.g., TIME, Jan. 3, 1977, at 24, 44. See generally BuSINESS WEEK, Jan. 17, 1977, at
48.
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